U.S.S. TANG (SS 306) c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California
SS 306/A16-3 Serial 011 July 14, 1944 CONFIDENTIAL
From: The Commanding Officer To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet Via : The Commander Submarine Division 141 The Commander Submarine Squadron 14 The Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet The Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet
Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS 306), Report of Third War Patrol.
1. Enclosure (A), covering the third war patrol of this vessel conducted in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea, during the period 8 June 1944 to 14 July, 1944, is forwarded herewith.
R. H. O'KANE
Returned from second war patrol May fifteenth and completed normal refit on
the thirtieth. Conducted post repair trials, training with three days underway,
loaded and departed June 8.
1330 Underway in company with U.S.S. SEALION for MIDWAY, conducting training
dives, fire control drills, and testing communications for future coordinated
JUNE 12 (-12)
0800 Arrived MIDWAY, fueled and located motor ground in a brush pigtail. Held
dock trial to insure that trouble had been remedied.
1600 Departed for EAST CHINA SEA at two engine speed.
JUNE 12(-12) - 21 (-9)
Enroute area, delaying an hour near SOFU GAN to tune SJ radar. As
experience in training showed that we could clear seven lookouts and the
OOD from the bridge without delaying the dive, used this number in the
daytime and kept the SD secured. We sighted no planes and none apparently
JUNE 22 (-9)
1706 Dived thirty miles from YAKU SHIMA prior to passing through COLNETT STRAIT
2000 Shortly after surfacing picked up 142 megacycle radar, apparently on YAKU
SHIMA, with our APR-1 equipment, so gave it a wide berth, using our SJ
periodically and never within forty-five degrees of the island. Though
this is an arbitrary safety angle, and island that has radar will most
certainly have detectors too, and the least we can expect is re-routed
JUNE 23 (-9)
0350 Made rendezvous with SEALION south of KUSAKAKI SHIMA, a little late as we
had delayed to investigate a possible SJ contact. Patrolled submerged
southwest of the island during the day, but with periodic high periscope
2000 Proceeded to DANJO GUNTO to meet USS TINOSA.
JUNE 24-25 (-9)
0115 Made scheduled rendezvous with TINOSA and SEALION fifteen miles south of
DANJO GUNTO. Executive officer went aboard TINOSA, delivering infra-red
signalling apparatus, code for coordinated attacks, and TANG's ideas for
patrolling this area. With everything in agreement, proceeded northeast
for submerged patrol south of FUKAE SHIMA, prior to closing KOSHIKI
0808 Sighted small patrol boat and avoided submerged.
2145 After dodging numerous lighted sampans along the 100 fathom curve, sighted
a large convoy on the SJ at 20,000 yards, just having emerged from KOSHIKI
2153 As course and speed were at first ambiguous, sent contact report of
convoy's position only. SEALION acknowledged.
2220 Having tracked convoy on courses between 315 and 270 at speeds from 10 to
16 knots, answered TINOSA's request for convoy course and speed.
2227 Sent latest course of 230 and speed 12.
We were in what at first appeared a fortunate position on the convoy's port
bow, with a three day old moon about to set, but as numerous bow and
flanking escorts appeared on the radar screen it became evident that
undetected penetration from ahead or from the flank would be nearly
impossible. The composition of the convoy, which had been confused by
numerous escorts and side lobes, now was clarified with visual sighting.
There were at least six large ships, in column sections of two, surrounded
by two circular screens of at least six escorts each, and as we later
discovered, each section was further escorted ahead and astern.
ATTACKS NO'S 1 AND 2
As the quarter escorts were well dispersed, elected to approach from the
stern. We passed between them without difficulty, diverged to starboard
and avoided a third patrol, and gained position 2500 yards on the starboard beam of the last section.
The leading ship was a large modern four mast or goalpost freighter with high composite superstructure topped by a large short stack, believed to be (EU) of the AOBASAN MARU class, page 84, ONI 208-J(rev'd). The second ship was a modern tanker with large short funnel, similar (EU) to the GENYO MARU or KYOKUTO MARU, page 277 or 279, ONI 208-J(rev'd). Both ships were heavily loaded, and most probably diesel driven as they did not smoke.
2349 The convoy, now close to NOMO SAKI, had settled on course north at 10 knots when we stopped, turned left for straight shots, and fired three torpedoes at the freighter, 120 starboard track, range 2600, spread his length by constant TBT bearings, followed immediately by a similar spread at the tanker, 100 starboard track, range 2450. All gyros were between 12 right and 2 left. Observed two beautiful hits in the stern and amidships of the freighter, timed as our first and third torpedoes. The second was observed to run erratically to the left. The explosions appeared to blow the ship's sides out, and he commenced sinking rapidly. On schedule, our fourth and fifth torpedoes hit under the stack and just forward of the after superstructure of the tanker. His whole after end blazed up until extinguished as he went down by the stern.
0000 We now evaded the closest escort at 1400 yards apparently unobserved, so pulled up seven thousand yards from the convoy and five thousand yards from where our targets would have been. Their pips, separating from the convoy, had gradually disappeared from the PPI screen however, and only a low hanging cloud of smoke marked the spot where they sank.
0015 Sent message to other boats that we were trailing and gave convoy's set-up, and repeated it twenty minutes later at SEALION's request.
0020 As the only radar interference indicated that our other boats would not get in, especially as the convoy was close to NAGASAKI, whose steel mills loomed up like Marin Ship, started in for another attack. Our approach was spurred by an escort who closed to fifteen hundred yards as we passed the vicinity of the first attack, but unable to see us in the haze of a slight overload, commenced dropping terrific depth charges. He succeeded in calling out the dogs however, and our target, which was first tracked at ten knots, showed stopped, then a range rate of better than forty knots closing! We had just time to complete a 90 degree turn when he passed sixteen hundred yards astern, a modern looking DE. He spotted us, closed for a minute, but our team of overload experts, watching their temperatures, got us rolling at 22 1/2 knots in spite of our unconverted #4 MBT. Easing off each time he showed a slight angle, we opened the range to 3400 yards when he illuminated. Hoping to take advantage of the experience of others, we dived a little faster than a rock, encouraged by a sounding taken during the chase. Though his searchlight illuminated the bridge diving alarm for our PCO, he still did not spot us, and passed well clear, madly echo ranging.
0200 Now with time to consider, believed the NAGASAKI area would be very unhealthy at dawn two hours hence, so surfaced and rounded the KOSHIKI islands where we could guard the southern approaches to the straits.
0500 Commenced submerged patrol.
1900 Sighted patrol broad on northerly course; avoided.
JUNE 26 (-9)
ATTACK NUMBER 3
0424 Shortly after crack of dawn sighted ship on the SJ at 8000 yards which had just rounded NOMA SAKI from KOSHIKI straits. We were already on his beam, but fog and rain permitted a full power end-around with only occasional glimpses of our enemy. He was a modern sized, split superstructure, MFM freighter, similar (EU) to the LKIMA MARU, page 228, ONI 208-J (rev'd), tracked at eight knots on courses hugging the coast. With the freighter obscured by rain, dived a thousand yards off his track, range 7000 yards. As we were 3000 yards west of BONO MISAKI; a good firing range was insured. 0551 Turned right for a stern shot as the freighter came out of the rain and fired four MK 18 torpedoes, range 1950, 100 starboard track, gyros near 180, spread his length by constant bearings. The torpedoes were set on six feet as the sea was calm and the loading of the freighter could not be ascertained beforehand. Though we had a zero angle on the boat, two of the torpedoes broached several times and then settled down on surface runs, throwing plumes in the air. Needless to say the freighter avoided the spread by turning toward. All exploders operated as the torpedoes hit the beach if that is any consolation. After some gunfire, the freighter took refuge in a cove north of BONO MISAKI, and as we were getting set toward 0640 the beach, surfaced and made a full power dash to the west, unsighted by the late arriving patrol boat.
0958 Dived when overcast lifted. 1008 Sighted "Betty" searching. 1608 Sighted "Betty" searching again. 1758 Sighted "Dave" searching. 2000 Proceeded to northwest for coordinated patrol with TINOSA and SEALION of a suspected SHIMONOSEKI-SHANGHAI traffic route. Passed numerous lighted sampans.
June 28 (-9)
Conducted submerged high periscope patrol on direct route between SHIMONOSEKI and SHANGHAI. 1945 Continued to the northwest at one engine speed. 2000 Detected 150 megacycle radar on either SAISHU TO or MARA TO, so rounded them at fifteen miles to avoid possibility of detection and followed our usual policy of not training the SJ within 45 degrees of known radar installations except for a fast periscope sweep.
JUNE 29 (-8)
0220 When 40 miles northwest of SAISHU TO, detected weak 95 megacycle radar, perhaps from the eastern end of that island, and at the same time commenced tracking a radar contact near KAKYO TO at 26000 yards. This proved to be side lobes of the island. The strength of our 95 megacycle radar did not increase as we approached KAKYO TO, so this island is eliminated as a possible source. 0441 Commenced submerged patrol near HEN SHO, half way between KAKYO TO and SANTAI TO off the southwest coast of KOREA. This position was close to the suspected route across the YELLOW SEA to the CHINA coast. Low fast moving fog patches and fogging periscopes made searching difficult, so came to radar depth periodically.
ATTACKS NO'S 4A AND 4B
1140 Sighted a freighter to the north on a westerly course. Commenced approach, but it soon became apparent that we could not reach an attack position submerged. We therefore opened the range on a diverging course, surfaced, and commenced and "end-around" bucking a heavy sea. Reduced visibility permitted passing the ship with only occasional glimpses at 15000 yards. 1600 Having tracked the enemy on course 255 at 7 knots, dived directly on his track for periscope attack. The freighter came on nicely, identified (EC) as TAZAN MARU, page 215, ONI 208-J (rev'd). His masts had been cut off level with the top of his stack, but all other details were as shown. He was lightly loaded, but in view of our experience of the twenty-seventh, decided that ten feet was the absolute minimum depth setting for this sea. After two "dipsey doodles" to adjust position, and with several echo ranges 1759 and bearings checking, fired two Mk 14 torpedoes, one at his foremast and one at his mainmast, 90 port track, range 1250 yards, speed seven. Raised the periscope again to see the smoke of each torpedo at its point of aim, but they apparently passed under. The enemy turned toward and gave us two close depth charges shortly after we had reached two hundred feet, fifty feet off the bottom. Fifteen minutes later, as we were approaching periscope depth, a loud crackling noise came over sound followed by a third fairly close charge. 1910 We went back down, but searched and surfaced fifteen minutes later with nothing in sight. This points to the possibility that this last was a delayed action depth charge used in this shallow water for the purpose of keeping a submarine down while the ship escapes. 2030 It didn't work in this case however, for we made radar contact in a little over an hour and commenced tracking again. Our enemy had gone to the north, was tracked on course 040, then 070 at ten knots, heading for KO TO and the ten fathom curve off the KOREAN coast. We closed sufficiently to identify him, and then turned the tracking over to the section on watch with the plan to attack after moonset on the lee of DIAKOKSAN GUNTO.
JUNE 30 (-8)
The freighter was a little out in his navigation, however, his track passing about fifteen miles north of the islands. As firing in the lee was now impossible and the sea rougher still, determined to attack from a range to insure hits even with broaching torpedoes. 0040 Commenced approach from his starboard bow directly down wind and sea, stopped with range 1500, angle on the bow 40 starboard, killed headway 0101 as he came on, and fired a Mk 14 "feeler" torpedo set on six feet from number five tube, range 750 yards, 92 starboard track 6 degree gyro, enemy speed nine knots. In spite of the heavy seas it ran perfectly, its phosphorescent track visible among the white caps right to the freighters side. The explosion amidships, just thirty seconds after firing, was as beautiful as it was reassuring. It broke the freighter's back, his stern sinking with a down angle, his forward section with an up, in a cloud of fire, smoke, and steam. His gun crew had guts, however, and got off five or six shots in spite of their tilting platform. When they had ceased firing we relieved about twenty lookouts in rapid succession, and today our crew is discussing single versus multiple torpedo fire. (We'll continue, however, to fire as many as is considered necessary to sink the enemy.) The inability of the enemy to sight us is considered due in part to our light grey camouflage, ideal for this area, and the known inefficiency of lookouts into wind and sea.
0130 Proceeded to the west for submerged patrol after daylight.
JULY 1 (-6)
Commenced submerged patrol one hour after dawn, forty miles west of 0946 KO TO. Maneuvered to close a sailing junk, and surfaced to look him over. He lowered his sails after four rounds of four inch, but our plans to get some information from him became unnecessary when our high lookout sighted smoke over the horizon.
ATTACK NUMBER 5
1015 Commenced tracking smoke which quickly developed into two columns, and then the masts of two ships. One ship was zigging at intervals of from three to twelve minutes, while the others movements indicated an escort. After gaining position ahead and tracking these ships on base course 260 at eight 1322 knots, dived for periscope approach and attack. As the group came on, maneuvered for a Mk 18 stern shot at the escort who was about 1500 yards on the freighter's starboard bow. This placed us directly ahead of the freighter and insured a stern shot at him if the escort was not hit. The escort was now identified as a small engine aft freighter with gun forward and depth charges aft, probably the 1940 series (EU) of the AMAKASU MARU; page 270, ONE 208-J (rev'd), changed in that the bridge structure was aft. As TDC bearings were lagging, took several echo ranges and found his speed 1444 had increased to ten knots. Now with the set-up checking, fired two Mk 18 torpedoes, one under his foremast, the other under his stack, 100 port track, range 1250, depth setting six feet, then went ahead at standard speed to gain position on the freighter.
As the moments dragged out and time for the torpedoes to hit had apparently passed, expressed some quiet oaths about electric torpedoes, only to have the words jammed down our throats by a swell explosion. Slowed and looked to see the escort's stern in the air in a cloud of smoke, and the freighter turning back. At least half a dozen persons observed this ship sink, timed in two minutes and twenty seconds.
ATTACK NUMBER 6
We now felt that we had the freighter caught between third base and home, for he was nearly one hundred miles from the KOREAN coast and his track led through the probable positions of both SEALION and TINOSA. Sent them the contact report on the next hourly schedule and continued trailing submerged at five knots. With smoke still in sight, surfaced at dusk and commenced 1916 overtaking at full power on three engines, charging with the other and the auxiliary. Again we're thankful for our FAIRBANKS-MORSE, for as it later proved, our eighteen and a half knots in this combination was every bit necessary.
After radar contact with the enemy had been gained it became apparent that we would have to pass him up moon south of KO TO, but with full power on four main engines, we were waiting for him with two minutes to spare as he approached the southern tip of the island.
2224 Dived a mile and a half off the island, 1200 yards north of the track of the enemy who was now six thousand yards away. He slowed from eleven to nine knots as he passed the southern tip, but with three echo ranges and periscope bearings, the set-up was checking again as we commenced our turn for a straight bow shot. With range 500, 90 port track, gyros near zero, fired 2247 two Mk 14 torpedoes by constant bearings, the first at the middle of his after well deck, the second at the middle of his forward one. The first torpedo hit as aimed in twenty seconds exploding the ship's cargo which must have been munitions of some sort. A short section of the bow was all that remained intact of the whole ship, and it sank in twenty seconds. The second torpedo was "robbed".
This was a medium freighter, identified during and after attack number 5 and at close range by moonlight prior to firing as similar (EU) to SAMARANG MARU, page 130, ONI 208-J (rev'd).
2251 Surfaced close to debris and proceeded sixty miles to west for our usual patrol.
JULY 2 (-8)
Conducted submerged patrol with high periscope searches. 1007 Sighted masts of two trawlers.
JULY 3 (-8)
Patrolled as day before. 2250 Made scheduled rendezvous with SEALION, and executive officer boarded her to exchange information. She we unable to reach our first convoy, and failed to receive our message concerning the freighter, but had sunk an AK on the way to this expected traffic route. It will be interesting to compare the reports of SEALION and TINOSA with ours. for the expected route runs between their areas as assigned by TINOSA, while ours lies to the north. They have in general patrolled on the surface using their SD and have been driven down by planes. Though this may not be conclusive, it appears that they have shunted the traffic by us, for we've been patrolling submerged, surfacing for a good look now and then, and keeping SD secured. We've seen ships and no planes since after our attack on the 27th. The SEALION had decided to patrol the SHANGHAI area while we proceed north.
JULY 4 (-8) (WHAT A FOURTH !)
0005 Set course for position on the direct route between DAIKOKUSAN GUNTO and OSEI TO at three engine speed. As the sky was overcast at dawn, continued on the surface, and shortly sighted heavy masts of a ship to the northeast.
ATTACK NUMBER 7
0408 Stopped, put him astern, and determined his approximate southerly course, and commenced a full power dash to get on his track. We were a bit hampered by fifteen trawlers or fishermen, but with the enemy's bridge and stack aft already over the horizon, it was their presence which prevented our detection.
0500 With angle on the bow now 5 starboard, dived and continued approach. The massiveness of the ship as it closed resembled a man-of-war, and twenty minutes later a wide zig gave us our first good identification look. Her hull and arrangement were similar (EU) to the KUROSIO MARU, page 272, ONI 208-J (rev'd), with modifications as shown on accompanying drawing. During the next hour we were abaft his beam as he closed the ten fathom curve, zigging leisurely. On our straight course at full speed we closed the range continuously however, and though on most observations with angles on the bow up to 150 the situation looked hopeless, he finally reached a nine fathom finger west of AMMA TO and came back to a southerly course. Our fathometer, which had been showing four fathoms under our keel, now in quick succession showed three, two and then merged with the outgoing signal 0626 so we backed down and fired three Mk 14 torpedoes at stack, amidships, and forward by constant bearings, range 1600, 90 starboard track, speed 8, depth setting eight feet. Turned left with full speed and rudder, and heard healthy hits timed as our first and second torpedoes. We slowed and looked to see only the bow, stern, and masts sticking our of the water under a huge cloud of smoke.
0631 Surfaced, surrounded by 34 assorted fishing boats obviously awe-stricken. There were about fifty survivors in the water and large life boats, but as we could not dive in the eight to nine fathoms if we approached closer, headed west at three engine speed. The stern had sunk before we surfaced, and as we cleared the area, observed the protruding bow tip go under in bubbling foaming water.
This ship was observed at moderate ranges from various angles for over an hour, and the following features indicate that she was converted for use as an (XAV) seaplane tender or aircraft transport: Her masts and booms were approximately twice as heavy as those of a large freighter. Her bridge structure was open aft forming a hangar. Her stern had been extended by a large platform with triangular stern piece and was fitted with kingposts and long boom. An auxiliary radio mast topped her after superstructure, fitted with several antennas. The survivors were far in excess of a normal tanker crew. Except for her black stack and masts, she was war color. Comparing this ship with similar conversions in available publications, her standard displacement is estimated at sixteen thousand.
0730 When well clear of any small craft which could report our course, headed north and dived an hour and a half later, forty miles from the position of our attack.
1500 Commenced hearing very distant explosions, probably 52 miles distant to be exact.
1840 Having passed OSEI TO, sighted smoke beyond the OIYOKU group of islands, tracked on a southerly course. While figuring where and how we could get him under a full moon in more than ten fathoms, our problem was solved by a faint wisp of smoke to the west.
ATTACK NUMBER 8
Switched approach to this and closed at standard speed submerged until clear of OSEI TO, then surfaced in 1953 late twilight, but under a full moon. Twenty minutes later he was sighted on the radar at 18500 yards. We were in a fortunate position ahead and had only to move on to his base course of 110 which led toward OSEI TO and the bulge of the ten fathom curve. His long low silhouette was visible at 15000 yards, so tracked from that range, determining his moderate zigs of 20 to 30 degrees at 5 to 10 minute intervals. 2041 Dived and tracked enemy in by radar to 9000 yards, then commenced moonlight periscope attack. As he came on his silhouette developed into a long engines aft ship with raked bow, and with tripod mast and king posts forward and aft. Distinctive also was his mushroom topped bridge structure. After closing a left zig at standard speed, 2128 checked set up with several echo ranges, and fired last two bow torpedoes, one at forward end of after superstructure, the other forward of his bridge, range 900 yards, 90 starboard track, gyros near zero, depth setting eight feet. The first torpedo hit just aft of the bridge, breaking the ships back. The tripod foremast could be seen in the smoke and debris tilting aft as he sank by the middle. Let the crew 2131 hear the breaking up noises by the sound-1MC method, then surfaced to pick up a survivor. It was necessary to snake one of the two large overturned lifeboats alongside with grapnels, and threaten with tommy gun bursts to convince the one visible survivor to come aboard. Recovering a life ring was much simpler.
Both the new life boats, life ring, and visual observation of the vessel before firing show this to have been a new ship. She does not appear in any identification book. Our PCO and executive officer both observed this ship together with the commanding officer prior to firing, and estimate her tonnage to be 10000, the same as the modern tanker her hull was designed after. With some assistance as to detail from the prisoner, the silhouette of this ship has been drawn and is submitted. Of interest is the prisoners knowledge of the exact position where they were torpedoed, and apparent familiarity with shipping routes. Not so clear are his figures on tonnage, which range from 7000 to 10200, but he finally got across the idea that this latter figure was iron ore in her holds. Phonetically her name was AMA-KUKA MARU of the YAMASHITA KISEN KAISHU.
2328 After commencing another approach on what proved to be a sailing junk, headed northwest at three engine speed to round KAKUREPPI ISLAND and approach the DAISEI group before dawn.
JULY 5-6 (-8)
0345 Dived for submerged patrol 0845 Commenced hearing distant explosions, indicating that the opposition is still way behind us. 0917 Sighted distant smoke drawing to the south close to the KOREAN shore, south of the DAISEI ISLANDS. Although this was inaccessible in six fathoms of water, it practically assured an early attack against this coastal traffic off CHOSEN KAN. 1942 Proceeded on the surface to CHOSEN KAN (CHOPPEKI POINT).
ATTACK NUMBER 9
2257 When 8 miles west of CHOPPEKI POINT, after having tracked one side lobe and investigated several second pulse echoes, sighted a ship on the SJ at 29000 yards. Stopped and tracked it out to 32000 on a northwesterly course at 9 knots, then commenced a grueling end around. Under a full moon on a rippleless sea, the ship was visible at 20000 yards, so to insure an unalerted enemy for our last two torpedoes, passed 0227 him outside of 15000. When 30 miles from GAICKOSAN RETTO (BLONDE GROUP), stopped on his track seven miles ahead for a final speed and course check, then dived on a parallel course for a submerged attack. Checked the set-up by a radar observation at five thousand yards when the freighter was temporarily lost in the surface haze, and immediately experienced hopelessly fogging periscope. The set-up checked perfectly, however, showing 500 yards off the track, so returned to 60 feet to wet the scopes. He was clear and big on the next observation, at 1100 yards by echo range, 0320 so turned for the stern shot. Fired two Mk 18 torpedoes, one at his mainmast, one at his foremast, range 900 yards, 90 starboard track, gyros near 180, depth setting 6 feet. Both torpedoes hit exactly as aimed and there was only floating wreckage and broken life boats in sight when we surfaced two minutes later. The freighter was medium sized, mast funnel mast, composite superstructure, similar (EU) to OSAKA MARU, page 132, ONI 208-J (rev'd). 0325 As two pips at 16000 yards were closing, perhaps belated escorts, and the sky already pink, commenced full power run to the south toward SHANTUNG 0600 PROMONTORY. Dived fifty miles from attack and proceeded south at three knots. 1200 Counter attack, seventy miles distant, commenced. 1848 Surfaced a half hour before sunset and continued the seven hundred mile run out of the area.
JULY 7 (-8)
0427 Shortly after sunrise dived for a "Betty". 1230 Continued surface running. 1914 Shortly after sunset, dived a half hour for a distant plane, believed a "Betty". 2055 Picked up 250 megacycle radar, random, training. 2155 When between DANJO GUNTO and the southern mine field, sighted five equal sized pips on the SJ at 16000 yards on our track ahead. We were at four engine speed, which in part accounts for a range of 12000 yards before we got them astern. The night was lightly overcast with a near full moon breaking through, but nothing was sighted on a fairly sharp horizon at this range. As we conducted a reverse end-around to get on their quarter, tracked the group on course 310, nearly the reverse of our original course, then 340, then 060. Closed their quarter cautiously until blinker signaling was sighted at 13000 yards, but no blurbs against the horizon. Five legitimate jap ships would contain at least one smoker and would have been visible at a much greater range. Convinced that this was a "killer group", undoubtedly directed by our late plane, gave them a wide berth and continued toward area boundary.
JULY 8 (-9)
0500 Commenced submerged approach of southern islands prior to night passage. 1600 Proceeded on surface. 1940 Detected 250 megacycle radar. 2106 A minute after closing GAJA SHIMA light, observed a searchlight over the horizon to the right of the islands, and seventeen minutes later picked up 153 megacycle radar with random training. 2145 153 megacycle radar signal steadied at maximum strength, apparently trained on us. As we were already between GAJA SHIMA and TAIRA SHIMA at four engine speed, continued through the NAGANO STRAIT into a rising moon. The 153 megacycle radar remained steady with maximum signal as we passed NAGANONO SHIMA, indicating its location there. Five small vessels, two of them smoking, heading from north and south into the strait, may have been patrols. If so, they were a little late, and no difficulty was experienced in keeping their bearings drawing aft with TANG at full power. 2300 Set course east, but continued at four engine speed during the night.
JULY 9 (-9)
0839 Dived for half an hour and apparently avoided detection by a distant low flying plane. 1210 Sighted flare, and friendly submarine surfaced about 4000 yards on our starboard quarter. For the benefit of his fire control party, our base course was 090, speed 17, following cam #1 of our zig clock, making 15.8 good along the track. 2200 Sent message to ComSubPac concerning results, and information concerning killer group and departure for other boats.
JULY 10 (-9)
1030 Dived for fifteen minutes to avoid detection by a transport plane on a southerly course.
JULY 14 (+12)
1200 Arrived Midway.
Normal for all localities patrolled.
(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
No information not previously reported.
(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
1. OSEI TO NORMAL CHARACTERISTICS 2. KAKUREFEI PETTO NORMAL CHARACTERISTICS 3. SHUSEI TO NORMAL CHARACTERISTICS 4. DANJO GUNTO NORMAL CHARACTERISTICS, BUT LIGHTED INTERMITTENTLY 5. GAJA SHIMA NORMAL CHARACTERISTICS 6. SHIMO KOSHIKI NORMAL CHARACTERISTICS 7. MATA TO DIMMED 8. KO TO (DAIKOKUZAN GUNTO) NORMAL CHARACTERISTICS
(F) SHIP CONTACTS
See page 19 A.
(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS
See page 20
(H) ATTACK DATA
See page 21
(J) ANTI SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASIVE TACTICS
Except for the first convoy only one escort was encountered. The Japs were obviously unprepared and several hours late in their searches and indiscriminate depth charging and bombing. Evasion consisted of clearing the vicinity of the attack at high speed on the surface.
(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE
Both reception and transmission were satisfactory. Tests of the lower frequencies assigned to submarines were conducted with the U.S.S. SEALION while enroute Midway. The results were startling in that the lowest two frequencies would not carry beyond six thousand yards in daytime and eleven thousand yards at night even with maximum power. It was also found that with minimum power the range of 2204 KCS could be reduced to about twenty miles. The data recorded though incomplete will be submitted to the Force Communication Officer. It is felt that further tests should be conducted to determine the limiting range of various frequencies for specific power settings of the TBL transmitter, as these could be of considerable value in coordinated attack group operations. Further it appears that a frequency lying between 450 and 2204 is desirable. It might even be advantageous if this fell in a Japanese broadcast band.
The SJ Radar gave comparatively little trouble during this patrol. This may have been due in part to its intermittent use, generally at 10 minute intervals. The part failures are listed below:
Item Number Description Number of Reason for failures failure
12 Crystal 1 Bad TR tubes 130 TR tube 1 Lost vacuum 434 R 43 1 Voltage surge 444 R 44 1 Voltage surge 435 R 46 1 Voltage surge 325 R 47 1 Voltage surge 159 C 1 1 Voltage surge
The SD radar was not used during this patrol.
RADAR DETECTOR CONTACTS
Submarine Date Freq. Rotation Pulse Probable Position Sweep Rate Rate Location 18 mi. S. of 6/22/44 95 Random train 600 Yaku Shima Yaku Shima
25 mi. S. of 6/23/44 118 On 10 sec, off 20 sec 60 USS Sealion Danjo Gunto
25 mi. S. of 6/23/44 95 Random train 900 Danjo Gunto Danjo Gunto 25 mi. S. of 6/23/44 234 Random train 60 Danjo Gunto
25 mi. S. of 6/23/44 174 Random train 60 Danjo Gunto
Submarine Date Freq. Rotation Pulse Probable Position Sweep Rate Rate Location 15 mi. 220d 6/24/44 87 Steady on 900 Nomo Saki
31d - 57'N 6/25/44 260 Very weak 7 or 129d - 31'E 800
20 mi. W. of 6/28/44 150 Continuous 900 Saishu To Saishu To 40 mi. NW of 6/29/44 95 Very Weak 900 Saishu To
92 mi. West 7/1/44 249 Fairly strong 900 of Koto
60 mi. West 7/2/44 55 Random train 900 of Koto
40 mi. West 7/3/44 255 Ransom train 900 of Koto 40 mi. 7/5/44 249 900 bearing 120d from Kakureppi Retto
35 mi. S of 7/7/44 250 900 Saishu To
Days enroute to Midway 4 Days from Midway to Area 9 Days in Area 16 Days enroute to Midway 7 36
Days submerged 13
(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING
Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel Factor
0 25,000 30 days Indefinite
(U) MK 18 TORPEDOES
The TANG carried Mk 18-1 torpedoes in the after torpedo room. We experienced no difficulties. Routine was normal following that appearing in other patrol reports. Exchanging of torpedoes from cradles to tubes was not found necessary, however.
DATE TIME LAT LONG COURSE SPEED HOW RANGE TYPE 6/24/44 214032-60N 129-48E 320 10 radar 19000 Convoy 6 ships, 16 escorts
6/27/44 042431-16N 130-15N 140- 8 radar 8000 Medium AK 110
6/29/44 114034-37N 124-36E 265 7 periscope 8000 Medium AK 7/1/44 094634-37N 124-36E 250 9 sight 20000 Medium AK - Escort AK
Serial 024 In Care of Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California, 17 July, 1944.
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to U.S.S. TANG Report of Third War Patrol
From: The Commander Submarine Division Sixty-two. To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Subordinate Command, Navy Number 1504. (2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. (3) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. TANG - Report of Third War Patrol.
1. The TANG on this, her third war patrol, sixteen days after entering her assigned area, the East China and Yellow Seas, had fired 24 torpedoes in ten attacks and sunk 8 ships for a total of 39,000 estimated tons with 12 hits. The entire patrol covered a period of 36 days.
2. (a) Attack No. 1 and 2. On the night of 24 June, TANG on the surface tore into a convoy of six large ships with at least 16 escorts and with six torpedoes (three at each) sank a 7500 ton freighter and a 10,000 ton tanker. Mark 23 torpedoes were fired at an average range of 2500 yards, on 120 and 110 degree starboard tracks with 10 feet depth setting. One torpedo was observed to run erratically.
(b) Attack No. 3. Soon after dawn on 26 June an SJ contact at 8,000 yards provided a target in the form of a medium sized unescorted freighter. TANG made a quick end around run, submerged and fired four mark 18's from stern tubes with a depth setting of six feet on a 100 degree starboard track, range 1950. Two of the torpedoes broached and made surface runs alerting the target in time to allow torpedoes to be avoided. The freighter ran for cover while TANG surfaced and cleared area just ahead of a late arriving patrol boat.
(c) Attacks 4A and 4B. Just prior to noon on 29 June, while patrolling submerged an unescorted medium freighter estimated at 5500 tons was sighted on a course which prevented TANG reaching a firing position. TANG turned away, surfaced, made end around and four hours later submerged and fired two Mark 23's on a 90 port track range 1,250 yards with depth set at 10 feet. Both missed (probably passed under ship). Three close depth charges followed, one of which detonated under circumstances which might point to use of a time delay feature for shallow water. TANG surfaced and chased for an hour before regaining contact on SJ. Made an end around ant at a 750 yard range on the surface, fired one Mark 14 "feeler" set at six feet on a 92 degree track. This torpedo broke the ship in two and it sank under the eyes of TANG's crew. The apparent efficiency of TANG's camouflage job is noted with interest.
(d) Attack No. 5. On the morning of 1 July TANG on surface sighted and tracked a 4,000 ton medium freighter and a 2,000 ton escort freighter. Submerged for periscope attack she fired two Mark 18's at the escort-freighter range 1,250, 100 port track with depth set at six feet. One hit and the ship was observed to sink in 2 minutes and 20 seconds. The freighter reversed course and TANG trailed submerged until dusk when she surfaced, made end around, submerged again and in
(e) Attack No. 6. Sank the freighter with one hit out of two Mark 23's fired at a 500 yard range on a 90 port track with depth set at six feet. The manner in which this ship blew up indicates a cargo of munitions.
(f) Attack No. 7. As dawn on 4 July TANG made an end around on the masts of a ship and dove one hour later to continue the approach on what developed into a 16,000 ton (XAV) Seaplane tender or Aircraft transport. With rapidly shoaling water and the keel about to scrape the bottom TANG backed down and fired three Mark 23's, range 2600, 90 starboard track with depth set at 8 feet. Two hits sank this ship and TANG surfaced to clear the area in the midst of 34 fishing boats with about fifty survivors thrashing around in the water and in large life boats.
(g) Attack No. 8. In the late afternoon of the same day, 4 July, smoke was sighted and closed until picked up by radar at 18,500 yards and sighted at 15,000. After tracking to determine his zig plan a submerged radar periscope approach resulted in the firing of TANG's last two Mark 23's at a 900 yard range, 90 starboard track with depth set at 8 feet. One hit sank this ship and TANG surfaced and took aboard the one visible survivor and a life ring. The sunken ship from observation and questioning of the prisoner was estimated to be an ore ship converted from a modern tanker hull of about 10,000 tons.
(h) Attack No. 9. On the night of 5 July under a full moon an SJ radar contact at 29,000 yards was tracked out to 32,000 yards and then an end around run made which placed the TANG seven miles ahead of the target. In a submerged radar periscope attack the last two torpedoes, Mark 18's from the stern tubes were fired at 900 yards range with a 90 starboard track, depth setting 6 feet. Both torpedoes hit and two minutes later on surfacing only floating wreckage and broken life boats remained from a medium freighter of 4,000 tons.
3. This, the third consecutive outstanding patrol turned in by the TANG, was characterized by the same aggressive determined and efficient fighting spirit that was so noticeable in her first and second patrols. To her enviable record of sinking 5 ships totaling 41,969 tons on her first patrol and the efficient rescuing of 22 naval aviators on her second patrol the TANG now adds 8 more ships sunk for an additional 59,000 tons on this patrol.
4. Twelve hits out of 24 torpedoes fired, three of which were seen to run erratic, is an excellent score in any league and one which the TANG's Control Party may well be proud of.
5. Material condition on return from patrol was excellent. Refit will be accomplished by Division 62 Relief Crew assisted by the Submarine Base Midway.
6. The Commanding Officer, Officers and crew are most heartily congratulated on this very outstanding patrol. It is recommended that TANG be credited with inflicting the following damage upon the enemy: