U.S.S. TANG  (SS 306)
                                c/o Fleet Post Office
                              San Francisco, California

  SS 306/A16-3                                                      
  Serial 09                                  May 15, 1944                  

  From:     The Commanding Officer
  To  :     The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
  Via :     The Commander Submarine Division 141
            The Commander Submarine Squadron 14
            The Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet
            The Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

  Subject:  U.S.S. TANG (SS 306), Report of War Patrol #2.

  Enclosure:     (A) Subject Report.
                 (B) Track charts. (ComSubPac only)

       1.  Enclosure (A), covering the second war patrol of this vessel conducted
  in areas northwest of Palau, east of Davao, and at TRUK, during the period 16
  March 1944 to 15 May, 1944, is forwarded herewith.

                                                                           R. H. O'KANE                                     (A) PROLOGUE        Returned from first patrol March third and completed refit on the eleventh.    As no difficulties were expected or experienced, post repair was combined with   two day and one night training period.  Finished loading on the fifteenth, and   departed on second patrol at dawn March sixteenth.                                     (B) NARRATIVE                                     March 16 (12)   0655 Left Midway for Palau, proceeding at two engine speed.                                 March 17-22 (-12-11)        Enroute area conducting routine drills and dives.                                    March 23 (-11)   0512 Sighted trawler on patrol and avoided on the surface.  Our position, 150        miles East of PAGAN Island, indicates that this vessel probably was a        spotter, and not fishing.   1235 Dived for half an hour on sighting an unidentified plane.   1712 Dived until dusk to avoid being sighted while passing between PAGAN and        ALAKAMGA Islands.  Delayed an hour to insure peak radar operation while we        had land contacts available.  In spite of the excellent wave meters and        other apparatus now provided for tuning this equipment there is nothing        like a good land contact to demonstrate its proper operation.  Even the        experts concede this.                                    March 24 (-10)   0907 Changed course to north to intercept U.S.S. BARB's convoy.   1406 Dived for thirty minutes to avoid a patrol type aircraft.   1608 Dived for two SD contacts at ten miles.   1632 Surfaced and proceeded long reverse of expected convoy track until dark,        and then proceeded toward assigned area west of PALAU, as our orders will        not permit further delay.                                   March 25-26 (-9)        Enroute area.                                     March 27 (-9)   1651 Dived and avoided an unidentified aircraft.   2000 Entered area 10W, then proceeded to position sixty miles bearing 255d from        TOAGEL MLUNGUI pass, as assigned for strike on PALAU.                                     March 28 (-9)        On assigned station.  Conducted submerged patrol as ordered, by searching        continuously with 17 feet of both periscopes, sound, and guarding 450 KC on        the SD mast.                                     March 29 (-9)        Patrolling submerged as on previous day.   1210 Sighted patrol type plane.   1823 Just prior to surfacing, sighted thin raked mast of a ship.  Conducted        submerged approach at six knots until dark but could not close it        sufficiently to determine its identity.   1857 Surfaced, continued tracking, and took position ahead for moonlight        submerged observation and possible firing, although the "blurb" of the        target at 7000 yards seemed very small.   1950 Almost simultaneous with lightning flashes which revealed the target to be        a PA type patrol, six large planes in groups of two arrived on the scene.         They had on both running and landing lights and proceeded with what        appeared to be a routine submarine search.  As we were in an unfortunate        position ahead of the first PC, which was later joined by a second, it        required two hours at periscope depth and finally deep submergence to get        clear.                                     March 30 (-9)        Conducted submerged patrol, searching with seventeen feet of periscopes.   1217 Heard a good explosion, followed by a second fifteen seconds later.  As the        horizon was absolutely clear,   1227 surfaced for a better look.   1258 Sighted three planes, believed friendly, simultaneous with radar contact at        seven miles.  Dived and continued submerged patrol.                                     March 31 (-9)        Patrolled submerged on assigned station.   0721 Sighted bomber, fairly close.   1700 sighted medium bomber on easterly course.   2232 Sighted two planes on the SD at about 16 miles which bothered us for half
       an hour as they conducted a search under the half moon.  As the did not
       close inside eight miles, remained on the surface.

                                    April 1 (-9)

  0553 sighted a large plane on the horizon, dived and commenced usual high
       periscope submerged patrol for the day.

                                    April 2 (-9)

  0104 sighted flash over the horizon on bearing of PALAU, followed by apparent
       loom of searchlights.
  0553 Commenced submerged high periscope patrol.
  2000 Departed at one engine speed for newly assigned station 120-150 miles ease

                                    April 3 (-9)

  0100 Passed to operation command of ComTaskFor Seventy-One.
  0808 Dived for onehalf hour and apparently avoided detection by a patrol plane.
  2400 Entered new area east of DAVAO GULF.

                                    April 4 (-9)

       Patrolled on surface in center of assigned area, searching with both
       periscopes, sound to detect echo ranging, and SJ during reduced visibility.
  0347 Dived for three-quarters of an hour and apparently avoided detection by a
       plane sighted on SD at twelve miles.

                                    April 5 (-9)

       Searched on surface as on previous day.
  1042 Dived for forty minutes and apparently avoided detection by a plane sighted
       on the horizon.

                                    April 6 (-0)

       Patrolling on surface.
  2100 Departed area, proceeding ease at five knots on the auxiliary engine to
       conserve fuel.  Our number 4 MBT could not be converted by Submarine Base,
       Midway, during the last refit.

                                    April 7 (-9)

  0752 Dived for twenty minutes and avoided plane sighted on horizon, then
       proceeded toward former area at five knots, searching as usual with
       everything we've got.
  0900 Passed to operational command of ComTaskFor SEVENTEEN.

                                    April 8 (-9)

       Patrolling on the surface enroute newest area north west of PALAU.
  0900 Commenced passing through a field of oil drums which continued throughout
       the day.
  1500 SJ radar out of commission on afternoon test.  The radar officer, radio
       technician, and leading radioman were relieved of all other duties and
       commenced "round the clock" repairs.

                                    April 9 (-9)

  0330 Sighted an unidentified plane which did not close, so continued on the
       surface.  Numerous oil drums were again in sight all day.

                                    April 10 (-9)

  0058 Sighted plane on SD radar which closed to five miles before opening.
  0813 Dived for forty minutes for a plane on SD at 8 miles.  Apparently avoided
       detection due to overcast skies.
  1017 Sighted single mast and deck house of an apparent PC type patrol boat. 
       Dive and attempted to close to investigate, but height of eye range and
       change of bearing, when next observed form forty feet, showed him on a
       northeasterly course, at better than fifteen knots. and out of reach.  As
       we were then about fifty miles from TOAGEL MLUNGUI pass, and expecting
       shipping within a day, continued on submerged to close the island
       undetected, but searching with 17 feet of periscope.  It was a long haul
       from MINDINAO on the auxiliary engine, but other wise we would not have had
       sufficient fuel to complete the patrol.

                                    April 11 (-9)

       conducted submerged patrol ten miles west of NGARUANGL passage, with
       periodic high periscope searches.  From this position we would have been
       able to intercept shipping through this passage or around VELASCO reef,
       headed for TOAGEL MLUNGUI, and at the same tine, been able to spot and
       trail for night attack any traffic from this latter pass.  We considered
       this our first "likely spot" in nearly four weeks of patrol.

                                    April 12 (-9)

       As the TRIGGER was delayed in entering her lower half of area 10 NW,
       patrolled submerged five miles of TOAGEL MLUNGUI passage, covering her area
       as well as our own.

                                    April 13 (-9)

       Conducted submerged patrol between three and four miles off TOAGEL MLUNGUI.
  1220 Sighted four motored flying boat which apparently landed in the lagoon. 
       Repairs were completed to the SJ today, and it worked with peak performance
       on surfacing.  As we have patrolled close in and enjoyed bright nights, it
       is doubtful that any shipping slipped by us, especially as TOAGEL MLUNGUI
       pass would hardly be used at night, unlighted.

                                    April 14 (-9)

  0154 Sighted U.S.S. TRIGGER on the SJ radar, as she crossed our area.  Closed
       her and made preliminary arrangements for mutual assistance ion covering
       this area, and established sound communication for later use.
       Patrolled two miles off TOAGEL MLUNGUI during forenoon.
  1400 As passing squalls developed into steady rain, surfaced, moved out to five
       miles from the pass, and conducted radar search.  After dark, moved out to
       contact TRIGGER, but SJ failure prevented early rendezvous.

                                    April 15 (-9)

  0011 Sighted U.S.S. TRIGGER, and sent over the following by the tin can-line
       throwing gun method: (1) All new information we have concerning this area.
       (2) Our ideas for its most effective coverage by two submarines.  (3) A
       duplicate copy of the coordinated attack doctrine and signals, for possible
       use.  Received compatible ideas for coordinated patrol,  and a report of
       TRIGGER's super convoy and her damage, for delivery to ComSubPac.  Returned
       to TOAGEL MLUNGUI before dawn and conducted submerged patrol three or four
       miles off pass during the day.
  1056 Sighted four engine flying boat.
  1638 Sighted four engine bomber.
  2152 Made rendezvous with TRIGGER who sent a rubber boat to TANG.  Supplied her
       with compressor valves and cages, radar tubes, and our spare battery blower
       motor to use as a sound training motor.

                                    April 16 (-9)

       Patrolled submerged two to three miles off TOAGEL MLUNGUI.
  0740 Sighted bomber.
  1400 As TRIGGER was patrolling out today, proceeded southwest about three miles
       off the reef to investigate lower lagoon and western entrance to MALAKAL
       HARBOR.  No evidence of any shipping could be detected.
  1552 Sighted bomber over lagoon.

                                    April 17 (-9)

       Patrolled submerged three miles off TOAGEL MLUNGUI.
  1215 Sighted large flying boat which apparently landed in lagoon.

                                    April 18 (-9)

       Patrolled submerged off TOAGEL MLUNGUI.
  1013 Sighted flying boat over lagoon.
  2130 Made rendezvous with TRIGGER.  Sent over compressor valves to her and
       exchanged spare SJ modulator units in hopes of fixing our ailing SJ radar.
       Completed repairs during the night.

                                    April 19 (-9)

       Patrolled in same vicinity as on previous day, withdrawing as usual to the
       northwest during the night to insure a night radar run on any inbound

                                    April 20 (-9)

       Patrolled as on previous day.
  0750 Sighted flying boat.

                                    April 21 (-9)

       Patrolled three miles off TOAGEL MLUNGUI.
  0619 Sighted bomber on westerly course.

                                    April 22 (-9)

  0439 Sighted searchlight over the horizon in vicinity of harbor.
  0504 Commenced submerged patrol closing to former position off TOAGEL MLUNGUI.
  1143 Sighted five bombers flying south over the island.
  1305 Sighted another bomber over lagoon headed west.
  1440 Sighted flight of six bombers over the island.
  2040 Departed for area fifteen to perform lifeguard services, proceeding at one
       engine speed.  Though we regretted leaving this area without making our
       presence felt, our observations lead us to believe that it will remain
       stagnant for some time and that our route to TRUK will offer better chance
       of contact.

                                    April 23 (-9)

  Enroute TRUK at one engine speed, searching with both periscopes, sound to
  detect echo ranging, and SJ radar during passing squalls.
  1840 In anticipation of bombarding the phosphorite refinery on FAIS Island the
       following evening, commenced firing seven rounds to determine the limiting
       point of twilight for accurate pointing and training, and t establish the
       ballistic to make the sight bar range equal radar range to the splashes.

                                    April 24 (-9)

  0600 As we were sufficiently ahead of schedule, changed course to close FAIS
       Island, forty miles north of our track.
  1000 Dived fifteen miles from the island and closed at four knots.  As we were
       aware of the reported gun emplacements, established the bearing line
       between lookout tower and refinery as 128dT, then proceeded around the
       island for bombardment by indirect fire.  Surfaced in evening twilight with
       lookout tower, our point of aim, bearing 308dT, range 7300 yards, and
  1828 commenced firing 33 rounds of four inch.  To insure crossing the refinery,
       employed a rocking ladder of 200 and then 100 yard steps, and applied
       deflection spots as previously computed to include other structures in the
       installation.  Though the results were not discernable, the shell
       detonations sere nicely visible at the bottom of the ladders and the target
       area was crossed several times.  As expected, their guns, placed to protect
       the installation on the west side of the island, were unable to return any
  1845 Set course for new lifeguard station off TRUK at one engine speed.

                                  April 25-26 (-10)

       Enroute TRUK.

                                   April 27 (-10)

  0859 Dived for a six mile SD contact simultaneous with high periscope sighting
       of smoke to the southwest near HITCHFIELD BANK.  On return to periscope
       depth eight minutes later, sighted the plane going away, and then the smoke
       from fifty feet.  There were two patches tracked on a westerly course at
       about ten knots.  Our attempts to "end around" before the enemy might reach
       GRAY FEATHER BANK were frustrated by the air coverage which drove us down
       five times before noon, the last with a "swish", perhaps of a dud bomb, and
       a rattle of machine gun bullets.  Continued trailing for three more hours,
       but sighted not more smoke.  The enemy was now an hour on the bank, and a
       hundred mile chase faced us with no assurance that we could guess where he
       would again strike deep water.  Faced with this, and the problem of
       reaching our lifeguard station by the following day, regretfully set course
       for TRUK.

                                   April 29 (-10)

  0714 Dived on boarder of assigned area northwest of TRUK, and apparently avoided
       detection by a distant twin engine bomber.  Continued high periscope
       submerged patrol throughout the day.
  1522 Sighted distant plane on easterly course in direction of island.
  1718 Sighted tow float planes.
  1859 Shortly after surfacing dived for a six mile SD contact which closed slowly
       to two miles.  Remained submerged for an hour.

                                   April 29 (-10)

       Continued submerged high periscope patrol, working around to lifeguard
       position east of TRUK for strike from MARSHALLS.
  0550 Sighted float plane fairly close.
  1928 About a half hour after surfacing commenced tracking attacking Liberators
       which passed seven miles north of us enroute TRUK, which was thirty miles
  1950 Observed several explosions in direction of island.
  2000 Commenced diving at approximately one hour intervals to avoid a determined
       search of the area along our bearing from TRUK.  As our bearing was 110dT
       from DUBLON, quite to the south of the track of Liberators returning to
       ENIWETOK or other MARSHALLS base, it was at once considered that this
       search was for us.  Their search consisted of dropping increasing numbers
       of flares as the approached us from the island, employing three to four
       planes.  The closest flares were about five miles distant.  The plane
       contacts would continue to close to from three to four miles where they
       would fade out, most probably as the searchers came low to locate us by
       silhouette, for dead in the water we were probably invisible from overhead. 
       Naturally we dived at this point for their search.  After three such dives
       we moved out to forty miles from the island and were no longer troubled,
       although moonset may have caused them to fire up.  It certainly appeared
       that the planes were vectored out along our bearing and that they did not
       know as distance from the island.  Further, our distances checked with data
       concerning the DF'ing of the SD radar received subsequently.

                                   April 30 (-10)

       On surface in assigned position for carrier strikes on TRUK, 40 miles
       bearing 180d T from MOEN Island.
  0400 Sighted strong radar interference on the SJ on mean bearing 240d T,
       obviously from our approaching task force.
  0436 Sighted low flying plane or planes on SJ radar, which passed 4600 yards
       from us headed toward our task force.
  0530 Sighted first planes on SD.
  0610 Watched plane go down in flames over DUBLON Island.
  0630 Dived for thirteen minutes and avoided a group of possibly unfriendly
       planes which closed rapidly to two miles.
  0643 On surfacing, flights of up to fifty planes were continuously shuttling
       between TRUK and the southwest.  With the possible exception of a sinking
       maru, this was the most encouraging sight we've witnessed in this war to
  0815 Sighted tops, then superstructures of our task force.
  1025 Received first report of downed plane and headed for reported position two
       miles off FOURUP Island at emergency speed.  Bombers working over PALAU and
       OLLAN Islands were most reassuring, and with numerous fighters to guide us,
       locate the life raft promptly about four miles west of its reported
  1156 With Lieutenant (junior grade) S. SCAMMELL, USN, J.D. GENDRON, AMM2c, and
       H.B. GEMMELL, ARM2c on board, withdrew six miles to the south.
  1559 Proceeded at emergency speed on a course to round KUOP Islands to reach
       life raft outside reef on the east side of TRUK.  Fifteen minutes later
       however a second raft was reported to the north of us in the approximate
       position of our first recover.  As the latter could be reached during
       daylight, returned at emergency speed to this position two miles east of
       OLLAN and one mile off the reef.  The hovering bomber and two fighters
       seemed perturbed that we wouldn't follow them over to the actual position,
       some five miles inside the reef.  As a twenty minute search with periscopes
       and from atop the shears did not locate the raft, headed south again to
       carry out the original plan.  All planes had now been recalled, leaving us
       a bit naked, so to avoid a prolonged submerged retirement, opened fire with
       4" H.E. on the gun emplacements on the southwest end if OLLAN Island.  Our
       ballistic of the previous week again proved correct, for with sight bar
       range 300 yards less than radar range, the first shell burst nicely low in
       the trees intended to conceal the emplacements.  Fired twenty rounds of
       H.E. and common when retiring, quite agreeably amazed at the ability of the
       4" to stay on the target.  Corrected radar range fed continuously to the
       gun, with occasional salvos spotted short, appears a simple and adequate
       means of fire control.  At 3500 yards trained in and turned tail, a bit
       prematurely, however, for the nips crawled out of their holes and let fly
       at us.  Their first splash was about 1000 yards short, the second we didn't
       spot.  Remained submerged for forty minutes, then surfaced and proceeded
       toward east side of TRUK at emergency speed.
  2143 From position six miles ease of FEINIF Island on the eastern reef,
       commenced zigzag search to the southwest at ten knots.  Fired green Very
       starts every fifteen minutes at the turns and midway of each leg, hoping
       for any sort of answer from one of the rafts.  The only reply, sighted on
       some occasions, was a series of red or white lights in the neighborhood of
       UMAN Island, which changed bearing rapidly as if flashed along a runway. 
       One of the pilots we recovered the following day had sighted our stars, but
       was afraid to answer them.

                                     May 1 (-10)

  0330 Proceeded east to a position for second day's strike, ten miles closer to
       the Island then on the previous day.
  0340 Sighted radar interference of our task force.
  0600 Sighted conning tower of jap submarine proceeding south around KUOP from
       OTTA pass.  Submerged and commenced approach.  Tracked him on straight
       course 180d at 12 knots.  When the generated range was 3000 yards and angle
       on the bow 30 starboard, suddenly lost sound contact.  Took a quick look to
       observe our bombers and fighters overhead and to confirm our fears that the
       enemy had dived.  Dropped to 150 feet and rigged for silent running, by was
       unable to regain contact.  Headed southwest for an hour at standard speed,
       then surfaced and proceeded to the northwest toward the reported raft of
       the evening before.  Spread large colors on deck to help identify us, then
       reported enemy sub to the task force commander for possible attack.
  0828 Headed at emergency speed for life raft reported two and a half miles
       southwest of our favorite OLLAN Island.  Before we reached the scene, a
       float plane from the U.S.S. NORTH CAROLINA capsized in the cross chop in
       the attempt to rescue.  The other NORTH CAROLINA plane made a precarious
       landing and on our arrival was towing both raft and fellow pilot clear of
       the island.  This action was most helpful, for we expected competition from
       OLLAN, and nearby fighters were already strafing her gun emplacements for
  0917 After lieutenant J.J. DOWDLE, USNR, Lieutenant (junior grade) R. KAUZE, for
       whom we had searched the night before, and R.E. HILL, ARM2c, were on board,
       and the second plane from the NORTH CAROLINA  had somehow gotten into the
       air again, we proceeded to sink the capsized plane with 20mm fire.  At this
       time a smoking torpedo bomber was spotted hitting the water about seven
       miles to the east.  Proceeded down the bearing at emergency speed, and
       opened fire on nearby OLLAN as we passed.  They had removed the trees
       intended to camouflage their position, evidently feeling it was no longer a
       secret.  It gave us an unobstructed point of aim, however, and our hitting
       4" H.E. with a few common sandwiched in, supported by strafing fighters and
       topped off with two bombers, must have discouraged them for they did not
       return any fire.
  1004 Sighted life raft and survivors ahead under circling fighters.
  1020 With Commander A.R. MATTER, USN, J.J. LENAHAN, ARM2c, and H.A. TOMPSON,
       ACM2c, on board, proceeded at emergency speed to round KUOP to reach three
       life rafts reported off the eastern reef.  As our track took us close by
       our submarine contact of the morning, requested and promptly got air
       coverage.  Blown high, with safety, negative and the fuel group dry, and
       even our Fairbanks-Morse smoking a bit, rolled through this spot at twenty-
       one knots fairly confident that the jap would get no more than a fleeting
       glimpse.  As Lieut(jg) BURNS had landed his NORTH CAROLINA float plane off
       the eastern reef, requested that he attempt to tow the rafts clear.  He was
       a big jump ahead of us however, having taken all seven men from three rafts
  1328 on board and taxied with them to seaward.  They were now in no immediate
       danger, so followed our escorting planes to a raft off MESEGON Island in
       the bight between KUOP and TRUK.  As we thoroughly expected to be driven
       down, rigged a free running line and life ring to the SD mast for towing
       the raft clear while submerged, but our strafing escorts evidently
       discouraged any opposition.
  1325 Recovered Lieutenant H.E. Hill, USNR, then headed for a fighter pilot
       reported in the water just off the eastern reef of KUOP.  By the time of
       our arrival planes had dropped a rubber boat to him, but he was too weak to
       do more than climb aboard one.
  1410 After pulling perhaps our most grateful passenger aboard, Lieutenant
       (junior grade) J.G. Cole, USNR, backed up wind clear of the reef and headed
       for the waiting float plane at emergency speed.  She was well clear, about
       three miles east of SAEAT Island, and no difficulty was experienced in
       bringing the following on board: Lieutenant R.S. NELSON, USNR; Lieutenant
       (junior grade) R. BARBER, USNR; Lieutenant (junior grade) J.A. BURNS, USNR;
       HRANEK, ARM2c; O.F. TABRUN, AMM2c; and R. HILL, ARM2c.  The action of
       Lieut(jg) BURNS, in making the rescue possible by deliberately placing
       himself in as precarious a position as any of the downed personnel. will be
       made the subject of a special report.
  1515 Sunk the float plane, which had a flooded battered tail, with 20mm fire,
       and proceeded at emergency speed to round KUOP to the last reported raft
       south of OLLAN Island.  As all planes were recalled as of 1630, and we
       could not reach the raft until sunset, requested two night fighters to
       assist in locating it.  Our passage through the area was of our morning
       contact was not quite as comfortable without air coverage, but again
       twenty-one knots took us through in a hurry.  The night fighters joined us
       at sunset as we were approaching the las reported position three and a half
       miles south of OLLAN, and immediately commenced their search.  Fifteen
       minutes later on of the fighters circled then fired several red Very stars
       four miles northwest of us.  Closed at emergency speed, spotting the raft
       from atop the shears, as it was now too dark for periscopes.
  1830 With Lieutenant D. KIRKPATRICK, USNR, and R.L. BENTLEY, AOM2c, on board,
       dismissed the planes and commenced slow speed search west of the atoll.

                                     May 2 (-10)

       Conducted submerged high periscope search off the western reef.
  0955 Sighted flying boat over the lagoon.
  1135 Sighted land plane near TOL Island.
  1211 Sighted land plane in the west on a northerly course.
  1220 Sighted probably same patrol on easterly course.
  1605 Sighted unidentified aircraft in the northwest, headed for TRUK.
  2005 Sighted A/A fire and explosions on TRUK from liberator raid.

                                     May 3 (-10)

       Searched as on previous day.
  1725 Sighted float plane headed west.

                                     May 4 (-10)

       Conducted submerged high periscope patrol in most likely spot to intercept
       traffic for OTTA pass.  Conducted search after dark, retiring to vicinity
       of OTTA pass for submerged patrol.

                                     May 5 (-10)

       Conducted submerged patrol off OTTA pass.
  0615 Sighted float plane to the south.
       After dark proceeded outside forty mile circle to position east of DUBLON
       for Liberator strike on TRUK.

                                     May 6 (-10)

  0056 Several planes passed seven to twelve miles from us, tracked by SD radar.
  0110 Sighted radar interference of U.S.S. PERMIT entering area.
  0116 Observed explosions on bearing of DUBLON.
  0200 Though all large plane contacts had disappeared, we were again bothered by
       searchers which maintained contact with us for another hour.  We stopped
       and headed up moon streak when they came within five miles, and avoided the
       closest on at three miles on a rain squall.,  The three pips then moved out
       to seven and finally twelve miles, and then disappeared.
  0300 With all planes departed and our relief in the area, set course for PEARL
       at two engine speed on prescribed routing.
  0557 Three quarters of an hour after our trim dive, submerged for twenty minutes
       and avoided a float plane, probably searching from the HALL Islands, fifty
       miles distant.  Had two plane contacts outside thirty miles during the
       remainder of the day.  After dark, sent message concerning airmen aboard.

                                     May 7 (-10)

       Enroute PEARL.
  0701 Tracked plane at forty miles on SD for some minutes.
  0825 Dived for twenty minutes to avoid a large low flying plane.
  1202 Tracked plane in from 14 miles.
  1204 Though sighted and identified as a TBM at eight miles, dived as his
       approach was menacing.
  1500 SJ radar out of commission on afternoon test.  The last modulator unit,
       obtained form TRIGGER, has also leaked its oil.  Commenced round the clock
  1800 Held demonstration of all identification flares and stars (ex-smoke bombs)
       for the benefit of the aviators on board, none of whom had seen them

                                     May 8 (-11)

       Enroute PEARL.

                                     May 9 (-11)

  0513 In position 120 miles from WAKE, dived for plane sighted on the SD which
       closed rapidly from 10 to 7 miles.  Though our position is nearly on a line
       between ENIEWETOK and WAKE, it is doubtful that a friendly plane would be
       hear at dawn.
  1137 Sighted plane on SD which closed from 17 to 12 miles before opening.
  1300 Slowed to one engine to conserve fuel.

                                     (C) WEATHER

       The weather was normal for the areas and periods covered.

                                (D) TIDAL INFORMATION

       The tidal conditions were normal.

                                (E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

       None sighted.

                                  (F) SHIP CONTACTS

       See charts.

                                (G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

       See charts.

                                   (H) ATTACK DATA

       No attacks.

                                      (I) MINES

       None observed.


       Extensive use of aircraft was bothersome day and night.  It is not believed
       that any were radar equipped, but some were obviously searching along our
       bearing from TRUK as noted in the narrative, most probably as a result of
       DF'ing our SD.  Off PALAU a combined aircraft and surface search was
       encountered which was avoided at deep submergence below a 26 degree

                            (K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

                                    SHIP CONTACTS

  No.  Date   Time    Lat.    Long    Type    Range Cse Spd  How    Remarks
  1  3/23/44  0512  18-40N  148-30N  Fishing  5000  var  Un  Sight  Evaded on 
                                     Patrol                         Surface
  2  3/29/44  1823  7-10N   133-35E  Patrols  14000 090  8   Per.   Tracked then
                                     2                              evaded
  3  4/10/44  1030  8-25N   134-05E  Patrol   20000      13  Per    D1sappeared
                                                             surf   over horizon
  4  4/27/44  0900  6-50N   148-50E  Smoke    30000 270  10  Per    Forced down 5
                                                             surf   times by air
  5  5/1/44   0800  7-10N   151-45E  Sub RO   14000 180  12  Per    Sub dived for
                                     Class                   surf   our planes

                                  AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

  No Date     Time  Long.   Lat.     Type     Range Crse Alt        How Sighted
  1  3/23/44  1235  18-15n  147-00e  Unknown  10 mi      1000 ft    Sight
  2  3/24/44  1406  17-37N  143-45E  Patrol   10 mi 140T 1000 ft    Sight
  3  3/24/44  1608  18-03N  143-41E  Not      10 mi                 Radar
  4  3/27/44  1651  09-030N 133-05E  Unknown   5 mi 045T            Sight
  5  3/29/44  1210  07-21N  133-24E  Patrol    8 mi 050T 1000 ft    Periscope
  6  3/29/44  1950  7-10N   133-40E  Unknown  Various               Running lts
  7  3/30/44  1258  7-18N   133-31E  Unknown   7 mi 135T            Radar & Sight
  8  3/31/44  0721  7-13N   133-08E  Twin Tail 2 mi 070T 200 ft     Periscope
                                     Twin Eng.
  9  3/31/44  1700  7-13N   133-08E  Medium    6 mi 090T 500 ft     Periscope
                                     2 Eng.
  10 3/31/44  2230  7-16N   133-31E           17 mi                 SD
  11 4/1/44   0553  7-20N   133-42E  Medium    7 mi 095T 1000 ft    Bridge Lookout
                                     2 Eng.
  12 4/3/44   0308  7-17N   131-28E  Float     8 mi 121T 900 ft     Bridge Lookout
  13 4/4/44   0847  7-41N   127-41E  Radar    12 mi                 SD
  14 4/4/44   1427  7-41N   127-41E  Flying    4 mi 200 ft          Sight
  15 4/5/44   1042  6-42N   127-45E  Unident   9 mi                 Sight
  16 4/10/44  0058  6-40N   133-35E  Unident   6 mi                 Radar
  17 4/10/44  0813  8-35N   134-00E  Unident   8 mi                 Radar
  18 4/13/44  1220  7-39N   134-24E  Flying   14 mi 130T 500 ft     Periscope
  19 4/15/44  1056  7-38N   134-25E  Flying    3 mi 160T            Periscope
  20 4/15/44  1638  7-38N   134-25E  Bomber    3 mi 150T 1000 ft    Periscope

   21  4/16/44 0640 7-36N  134-23E Bomber  3 mi  270 T   1000' Periscope Outbnd

   22  4/16/44 1652 7-28N  134-19E Bomber  5 mi  40      1000' Periscope Inbound

   23  4/17/44 1215 7-34N  134-23E 6 mi    6 mi  Circ.   500'  Periscope Inbound
   24  4/18/44 1015 7-39N  134-    2 motor 7 mi  Circ.   1000' Periscope Inbound
                           256E    flying        for     down
                                   boat          landing

   25  4/22/44 0620 7-43N  134-20E 2 eng.  6 mi  070 T   800'  lookout   Twin
                                   bomber                                tail

   26  4/22/44 1145 7-38N  134-24E   "     7 mi  190 T   800'  Periscope 5 in

   27  4/22/44 1305 7-36N  134-25E land    4 mi  230 T   900'  Periscope
   28  4/22/44 1340 7-36N  134-25E 6       20 mi 100 T   1050' Periscope 6 in
                                   bombers                               form.

   29  4/23/44 1643 9-05N  137-12E bomber  15 mi 257 T                        

   30  4/25/44 1445 9-02N  143-45E 2       10 mi 220           sight     Doubt

   31  4/27/44 0900 6-50N  146-50E fighter 6 mi  220     1000' SD
   32  4/28/44 0705 6-55N  151-05E bomber  15 mi north         lookout

   33  4/28/44 1521 6-55N  151-05E flying  20 mi               Periscope

   34  4/28/44 1537   "       "      "       "                     "     Possib.

   35  4/28/44 1718 6-55N  151-05E sea     1 mi  south   800'  Periscope
   36  4/29/44 0550 6-50E  156-00E   "     1/2           500'  Periscope

   37  4/29/44 1900 7-08N  152-07E many    2-14                Radar     Many
               2400                unident mi                            planes

   38  4/30/44 All  6-50N  151-52E Many                        Radar     Many
               day                                             sight     planes

   39  5/1/44  All  6-50N  151-52E Many    0-14                             "
               day                         mi
   40  5/2/44  1000 7-15N  152-35E flying  6 mi  120 T         Periscope

   41  5/2/44       7-15N  152-35E Zeke    3 mi                Periscope

   42  5/2/44  1605 7-10N  151-20E SB      12 mi 090 T   1000' Periscope Enterng

   43  5/3/44  1725 7-20N  151-20E Recc    10 mi 270 T   1000' Periscope Similar
                                                                         to SOC3

   44  5/4/44  1030 7-05N  150-28E Unident 7 mi  090 T   500'  Sight
   45  5/5/44  0615 7-08N  151-45E Recc    10 mi 225 T   1500' Periscope SOC3
                                                               SO        type

   46  5/6/44  0100 7-45N  152-35E         15 mi               Radar     Many

   47  5/6/44  0355 8-40N  153-00E Dave    12 mi 90      2000' Sight

   48  5/7/44  0000 12-50  156-10          15 mi 200     1000' Sight
   49  5/7/44  0820 12-55N 156-30E         8 mi          low   Sight     Dove to

   50  5/7/44  1205 13-25N 156-45E PBM     11 mi         High  SD Sight  Avoided

   51  5/9/44  0512 17-47N 166-30E         7 mi                SD        Dove to

                                  (L) COMMUNICATION

     Radio reception was good and no difficulty was experienced in any
  transmissions.  Of special note was the very satisfactory two way voice
  communication during the strike on TRUK in part due to the wardroom Hallicrafter
  receiver.  The frequency of 4475 could be answered by all planes and had the
  advantage of being clear of their VHF tactical frequency.  It was therefore
  possible for planes to direct us quickly, and for us to get their support when
  needed.  Voice on the RL receiver was quite often unintelligible.

                                      (M) RADAR

     The performance of the SJ radar was very satisfactory when it was in
  operation.  Fortunately its off periods in general coincided with bright nights
  when shipping could be sighted and to the return trip.  The trouble was
  generally in the new type transmitter and among other things entailed the
  failure of the original modulator  unit, the spare, and finally a third one
  obtained from the USS TRIGGER.  Around the clock repairs by our "long course"
  radar officer, a first class radio technician, and a first class radioman could
  only temporarily overcome the rate of breakdown.  A thousand man hours were
  devoted exclusively to its overhaul with only temporary results and the
  knowledge that "they hadn't said uncle" as a reward.  The details of the
  failures are listed below:

  Item                        Number of       Reason for
  Number   Description        failures        failure   

  135      VR-150/30 Tube        2            Lost gas
  120      6L6 (metal) Tube      4            shorted and weak
  121      6L6 (glass) Tube      1            poor emission
  134      VR-105/30 Tube        1            lost gas
  140      919 LP Lamps          4            Poor regulation
  117      6AC7 Tube             4            shorting and poor emission

  122      6SN7 Tube             2            poor emission
  118      6AG7 Tube             1            shorting
  127      705A Tube             3            not known
  116      504G Tube             5            shorting and poor emission
  129      717A Tube             2            soft
  119      6H6 (glass) Tube      1            shorted
  114      2X2 Tube              1            lost emission
  135A     5D21 Tube             1            gasious
  133      836 Tube              1            shorted
  137      5HP1 (cathode ray)    2            not known & one accidently
  128      706AY Magnatron       2            low R. F.
  97       Voltmeter             1            shorted out
  104      Renewal links for
           6 amp fused           32           overload
  106      Renewal links for
           10 amp fuses          18           overload
  213      capacitor, mica
           240 mf 500 volts      1            not within tolerance
  236      Cable assem. coax     1            arching
  242      Modulation network    3            leaking oil
  281      Resistor, .18 megs
           1/2 watt              1            open
  349      Resistor, .15 megs
           2 watts               1            burned out
  350      Resistor, 1 meg
           2 watts               1            not within tolerance
  361      Resistor 100 ohms
           2 watts               1            added to set
  366      Resistor 10,000 ohms
           wire wound            1            open
  363      Resistor 1600 ohms
           Wire sound            1            burned out
  411      Resistor 10,000 ohms
           2 watts               1            below tolerance rating
  444      Resistor, 7 megs
           10 watts              1            not within tolerance
  342      Resistor, 2200 ohms
           2 watts               1            burned out
  410      Resistor 10,000 ohms
           2 watts               1            open
  185      Capacitor, .5 mf
           600 volts             1            leakage
  148      Capacitor, .1/.1 mf
           600 volts             1            leakage

                                 SJ-1 M.G.

  19       Resistor, Designation
           5895405AB1            1            open
  20       Resistor, Designation
           5895405AB2            1            damaged during repairs
  25       Brushes, Designation
           8109931AA4            4            worn out
  27       Rotating elements
           Designation 8109978AC1  1          worn out

                         (N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS


                                 (O) DENSITY LAYERS

     None observed that have not been previously reported by other submarines.

                         (P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY


                                    (Q) PERSONNEL

           (a)  Men on board during patrol------------72
           (b)  Men qualified at start of patrol------24
           (c)  Men qualified at end of patrol--------59
           (d)  Men unqualified making first patrol--- 6
           (e)  Men advanced in rating----------------18

                            (R)  MILES STEAMED-FUEL USED

                                 Miles        Gallons

     Enroute Palau               3,500        27,000
     Enroute Dravo & return        900         4,000
     Enroute Truk                1,050         8,500

           TOTAL                 5,450        39,500

     On Station                  2,600        27,000
     Enroute Pearl               3,100        30,000

           TOTAL                 11,150       96,500

                                    (S)  DURATION

           Days enroute Palau--------------------------11
           Days enroute Davao-------------------------- 1 1/2
           Days returning Palau------------------------ 3
           Days enroute Truk--------------------------- 5 1/2
           Days in area--------------------------------29
           Days enroute Pearl--------------------------10
                                        TOTAL          60

           Days submerged------------------------------24

                         (T)  FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

     Torpedoes      Fuel         Provisions         Personnel Factor
        24          2,000          15 days             Unlimited

                                     (U) REMARKS


        The twenty tow aviators who witnessed a demonstration of submarine
  identification flares Mk 10, 11, and 12, submarine emergency identification
  signals Mk 2 Mod 2 (ex-smoke bombs), and Mk 1 comets (Buck Rogers gun),
  unanimously doubt their ability to note any but the Mk 1 comet, and that one too
  if already diving for an attack.  Along this same line is the fact that every
  pyrotechnic we could fire did not deter a friendly submarine from making as end
  around on us during our last patrol forcing us to avoid at high speed as soon as
  he dived.  Sure identification is becoming increasingly important as we traverse
  a thousand extra miles of U.S. patrolled waters.  Further, it may not always be
  possible or desirable to establish sanctuaries in coming operations, such an
  incident arising in this very patrol when an enemy submarine shared our area for
  a day or more.
        Means for reliable identification is at hand in the simple Mk 3 (mortar
  type) signal projector which was issued to submarines during 1938, but ordered
  turned in before many were installed.  The order to turn them in was based on
  the fact that the submerged signal gun could fire pyrotechnics of similar color. 
  The person issuing the order evidently did not consider the prohibitive delay in
  the use of the submerged gun for a surface projector.  The Mk 3 projector
  mentioned above provides a healthy pyrotechnic where it can be seen in a matter
  of a second or two, and its effectiveness was demonstrated on one of our
  submarines who reinstalled one prior to returning to the coast after her first
  patrol.  It successfully warded off numerous army planes, certainly the crucial
  test.  It is our present intention to procure one, at least for demonstration
  during the training period.

        The fact that one of the pilots later recovered observed our green Very
  stars during our night search east of TRUK but was afraid to answer, indicates
  the need for a simple identification under these circumstances  Rather than
  reverting to any complicated arrangement using a two or three color cartridge,
  especially as there is no advantage in having the submarine signal visible at a
  greater range the that from the raft, the following procedure is suggested as
  standard.  If accepted and publicized among aviators, it could well facilitate
  some rescues:
                    (a)  Submarine fire single green stars during night searches
  as conditions permit.
                    (b)  Raft reply with one of the five or six red stars with
  which each is now provided.
                    (c)  Submarine on sighting red star immediately reply with
  green stars and close the bearing, firing additional stars as necessary.


        In agreement with the U.S.S. SEAHORSE, it is hoped that the night
  periscope is not being held up by design difficulties of the radar feature.  The
  periscope itself will eliminate that "between the dark and the moonlight" period
  when the proper attack is near impossible.  This is nine tenths of what is
  desired.  Though the radar feature is very desirable, the ability to see the
  target group at considerable range will permit an aggressive submerged approach
  with firing ranges that will insure the hits.


        It was most disappointing to learn that the proposed aircraft search
  radar had been abandoned in favor of improvements to the present SD.  The sixty
  of the "bed spring" and the 60 degree overhead void were evidently the main
        The objection by commanding officers to the moderated size antenna is
  inconsistent, for there is hardly a submarine whose shears do not bulge with
  underwater loops, CUO antennas, lookout platforms, binocular rests, and "clear
  the bridge" poles.  Further, the proposed antenna could doubtless be designed to
  fold automatically in the manor of a music stand.
        The sixty degree blank cone overhead, which at first appears frightening,
  could well be given a little more thought.  Personal conversation with Commander
  Bernstein las summer indicated that this radar would be infallible in detecting
  planes up to twelve miles.  In other words, unless the enemy were coming from
  Mars, he would have to by flying at approximately 50,000 feet to escape
  detection.  Except in radar equipped planes, airmen admit that they'll probably
  not spot a submarine when flying above 15,000 feet, and will surely not detect
  him under the best condition s when above 25,000 feet.  Thus the proposed radar
  seem to offer a substantial safety factor.
        Overlooking the above, the weakness of the present SD is not in its very
  few internal failures, but in its unpredictable voids, its inability to detect
  low flying planes, and the obvious east with which the enemy is DF'ing and
  perhaps homing on it.
        Granting that any radar equipment must be accepted with its limitations,
  the enemy is not standing still, and the limitation of the SD may before long
  preclude its general use.  A static program of only improving present equipment
  is therefor unsound and should be avoided.  A farsighted program would include
  addition of the proposed aircraft search radar, with improvements to the present
  SD.  If below deck space is a problem in this installation, there is  a ships
  office any boat would donate.  If it is topside space, a permanent feeder
  running topside inside or outside the conning tower, thence between periscope
  shears to fixed SD radiators at shear top level would leave the after space
  available for a "bed spring" aircraft search radar.

        Except for internal failures, which will undoubtedly be ironed out by
  installation of more substantial parts, the SJ at present is a near ideal search
  and attack radar.  We are, however, accepting a reduced range simply because of
  the relatively low height of the reflector compared to the much similar SG
  installations in surface craft.  In addition to the greater area that could be
  covered with a higher reflector, is the probable necessity of tracking the enemy
  at greater ranges as his radar improves.  The design problems of a raisable
  reflector are not insurmountable.  One could and should be designed to operate
  at the height of our raised periscopes.  The most logical way to accomplish this
  would be first to install the new aircraft detection radar in the place now
  occupied by the SJ and move the SJ to the top of the present SD mast.  By
  removing the SD housing pipe, in the conning tower, and installing a well, the
  present hoist could raise this mast to the desired level.  A clutch type
  coupling, similar to our original periscope bearing transmitter coupling, would
  provide a ready means for power rotation to the mast in its raised or lowered
  positions.  The wave guide could be telescopic, with transmitter output fed to
  it near the bottom of the well.  It the present reflector is too heavy, a metal
  sprayed plastic one could be substituted.

        The minimum we should now be striving for is then two position SJ, an
  airplane search radar to augment the SD, and the coming periscope radar.
        Though the above opinions and ideas may seem too futuristic, it must be
  remembered again that the enemy is not sitting still.  We are still enjoying,
  though on the waning edge, an immense tactical advantage over him because of
  speed and radar.  However the minute we say "this is good enough" we're losing
  the offensive and he is catching up.  It would then be just a matter of time
  until submarines are again the "submerged vessels of opportunity" we used to
  believe them to be.

                            SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY-FOUR

  Serial  (039)                       In Care of Fleet Post Office,
                                      San Francisco, California,
                                      21 May 1944.      


  U.S.S. TANG  Second War
  Patrol Report

  From:         The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FOUR.  
  To  :         The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
           (1)  The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
           (2)  The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
           (3)  The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

  Subject:      U.S.S. TANG Second War Patrol - comments on.

       1.  Although disappointing in that no shipping loss was incurred by the
  enemy, the second war patrol for the TANG under Lieutenant Commander R. H.
  O'Kane as commanding officer was equally as outstanding as his first.  By virtue
  of remarkable cooperation with aircraft of the U.S. striking force attacking
  TRUK, willingness to proceed from point to point within gun range of shore
  batteries in order to rescue expeditiously personnel of downed aircraft, and
  seizing the initiative by bombarding known gun emplacements when passing OLLAN
  Island, twenty-two U.S. naval aviation personnel were rescued from lifeboats and
  downed aircraft.  During the sixty day patrol, twenty-nine days were spent on
  assigned stations in Palau, Davao and Truk areas,  No doubt the scarcity of
  targets is attributable in part to the presence of a heavy U.S. task force in
  the western Pacific.

       2.  Of five surface craft contacts three were small patrol craft and
  evaded, one was an RO class submarine which dived at a range of 3000 yards on
  appearance of U.S. aircraft, and one smoke contact of two ships.  It was
  impossible to close this contact because of combination of air screen attacks,
  proximity to shoal water on Grey Feather Bank and operation order to take a
  lifeguard station.  Of fifty aircraft contacts, twenty-two were sighted by
  periscope, eight were observed first by radar while four were made jointly by
  radar and sight, fifteen were seen by bridge personnel during daylight and one
  was discovered at night due to carrying running lights.

       3.  The performance of the SJ radar can not be classed as completely
  satisfactory due to the excessive time under repair and the abnormal quantity of
  spares required for maintenance.  The comments of the commanding officer on the
  general subject of radar are well taken; the use of both the SD and SJ radar
  must be supervised carefully to prevent aiding the enemy in counter measures. 
  Until such time as radar equipment non-susceptible of enemy detection, is
  available again to submarines, it will be necessary to utilize other equipment,
  primarily sound gear, to obtain data provided previously by radar.  Periscope
  radar is required more now than a year ago.

       4.  With the number of submarines being used on lifeguard stations and the
  morale effect on aviators participating in such raids, it is felt that a certain
  means of ready identification between submarines and the aviation personnel is
  essential.  Good voice communication between planes and submarines is required. 
  Air coverage of lifeguard submarines permits freedom of action by the submarines
  in moving from point to point in effecting rescues.

       5.  Health and morale of TANG personnel was excellent.  It is noteworthy
  that thirty-five men were qualified in submarines during this patrol, while
  eighteen out of a total of seventy-two on board were advanced in rating.  The
  TANG will undergo normal refit by Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor with particular
  attention being paid to radar equipment, and conversion of number four main
  ballast tank into fuel ballast tank.

       6.  The commanding officer, officers and crew are congratulated on the
  rescue of twenty-two officers and men of the naval aviation service.

                                                                                                               E. R. SWINBURNE                                SUBMARINE DIVISION FOUR   FC5-4/A16-3              Serial  0195                       Care of Fleet Post Office,                                       San Francisco, California,                                            C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L   SECOND ENDORSEMENT to   U.S.S. TANG  Second War   Patrol Report   From:         The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.     To  :         The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.            (1)  The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.            (2)  The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.   Subject:      U.S.S. TANG Second War Patrol - comments on.        1.  Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division   FORTY-FOUR.        2.  The lifeguard methods employed by the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. TANG,   coupled with his remarks on this type of operation have been made a basis for   training potential "lifeguards".        3.  Commander Submarine squadron FOUR adds his congratulations to those of   the entire service for the outstanding seamanship, tenacity and courage   displayed by the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the U.S.S. TANG.                                                        C. B. MOMSEN                            SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET   FF12-10/A16-3(15)/(16)              Serial  01028                       In Care of Fleet Post Office,                                       San Francisco, California,                                       27 May 1944.         C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L   FIRST ENDORSEMENT to                            NOTE:  THIS REPORT WILL BE   U.S.S. TANG  Second War                                DESTROYED PRIOR TO   Patrol Report                                          ENTERING PATROL AREA.   COMSUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 426   U.S.S. TANG - SECOND WAR PATROL.   From:         The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.    To  :         The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.   Via :         The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.   Subject:      U.S.S. TANG (SS306) - Report of Second War Patrol.                 (16 March to 15 May 1944).        1.  The TANG's second war patrol was conducted in areas northwest of   Palau, east of Dravao, and the vicinity of Truk.        2.  This entire patrol was outstanding in patrol efficiency, excellent   initiative, and aggressive spirit.  Throughout the patrol the TANG used all of   its equipment to the utmost efficiency.        3.  The remarkable recovery of 22 Naval aviators in seven different pick-   ups close to the reef at Truk and within enemy gun range is a sterling example   of how cooperation between the submarine performing lifeguard duty and planes of   the striking air forces can, by cooperation, make successful recoveries of our   downed aviators.  The aggressive, successful, and well planned bombardment of   Ollan Island contributed much to the eventual rescue of the downed aviators.    This patrol report should be carefully studied by all Commanding officers as a   guide for future lifeguard duty.        4.  It is of note that the TANG's contact with the TRIGGER and subsequent   exchange of necessary spare parts was instrumental in the latter vessel   continuing on a patrol that inflicted severe damage to the enemy.        5.  The remarks made by the Commanding Officer regarding the present and   future uses of radar by submarine s are greatly appreciated.  The Pro-Sub   section in This area and in the Department are constantly working on all new   developments including radar.        6.  This patrol is designated as successful for Combat Insignia Award.        7.  The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the   Commanding Officer, officers and crew for the aggressive and efficient manner in   which the lifeguard duty was performed resulting in the recovery of 22 Naval   aviators.                                                   C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

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