A16-3 U.S.S. TANG (SS 306) Serial 02 c/o Fleet Post Office CONFIDENTIAL San Francisco, California
March 3, 1944
From: The Commanding Officer To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet Via : The Commander Submarine Division 141 The Commander Submarine Squadron 14 The Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet The Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet
Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS 306), Report of War Patrol #1.
1. Enclosure (A), covering the first war patrol of this vessel conducted in areas north and west of TRUK, and north and west of SAIPAN, during the period 22 January, 1944 to 3 March, 1944, is forwarded herewith.
R. H. O'KANE
CONFIDENTIAL U.S.S. TANG
After completion December 1, 1943, trained eighteen days in San Diego area,
Arrived Pearl January 8, 1944, and continued training through the 19th, having
fired forty-three exercise torpedoes and conducted night approaches on
approximately half the days underway.
Left Pearl at noon on the 22nd and proceeded to WAKE ISLAND at one engine
Jan 29-Feb 5, (Plus 12)
Patrolled submerged in vicinity of WAKE except during false start for
assigned area on the thirty-first. Departed from assigned station southwest of
the island whenever the circumstances of special mission permitted, and closed
the island daily to insure that no shipping had passed our seventeen foot
periscope or radar searches.
The air strikes on the thirtieth and fifth were carried out without
incident. Except for dawn searchlight displays, the only activity observed
during the week was ineffectual searching after the first air attack by one or
two planes dropping flares sporadically. Observation from within three miles
did not disclose any damage to shore installation by the first air attack.
Feb 6-7 (-12)
Upon release from lifeguard duty shortly after midnight, proceeded at
fifteen knots to newly assigned station north of TRUK.
At 1345 on the seventh dived for twenty minutes and avoided an unidentified
plane. Slowed to eleven knots at midnight.
Feb 8 (-11)
Sighted U.S.S. GUARDFISH at 1315 and avoided on the surface. Entered
assigned area at 1500 and proceeded toward the western boundary to patrol the
Feb 9-14 (-10)
Patrolling on surface in recommended northwestern part of area, searching
with periscope, sound to detect echo ranging, and enjoying unlimited visibility.
Converted #3A & #3B to normal ballast tanks.
Feb 14-15 (-10)
Patrolled on surface in southwestern part of the area covering the route
from TRUK to SAIPAN which passes north of NAMONUITO. Proceeded south the night
of the fifteenth to patrol east of MOGAMI and GRAY FEATHER banks prior to
assuming new patrol station south of ULUL Island. At 1204 on the fourteenth and
at 0925 and 1123 on the fifteenth had plane contacts on the SD at 20, 24, and 28
miles. These were tracked out almost 35 miles.
Feb 16-17 (-10)
Conducting submerged patrol east of MOGAMI and GRAY FEATHER banks with
continuous periscope observation, and 17 foot searches. Proceeded toward
assigned position twelve miles south of ULUL after sunset.
ATTACK # 1
At 0025 on the morning of seventeenth, sighted a convoy on the SJ bearing
305T distance 31000 yards. It was tracked at eight and one-half knots on base
course 100d, directly into the rising half moon, and zigging forty degrees every
ten to fourteen minutes. As viewed on the radar, excluding side lobes, the
convoy was composed of two large ships, a somewhat smaller one, later believed
to be a destroyer, a small escort close ahead, two more escorts on either beam,
and two more wide flanking patrols.
At 0219, when nearly ahead, with range to convoy 15000 yards, the starboard
flanking escort suddenly appeared at 7000 yards closing at four knots. We were
forced down, deep, and given five depth charges, but his attack was half hearted
and we were able to return to radar depth fifteen minutes after he passed by.
The convoy was still 9000 yards away and coming on nicely. Our approach from
here in was quite routine, except for additional depth charges and patrolling
escorts. Went back to periscope depth at 4000 yards, watched the leading escort
cross conveniently to the opposite bow, the port escort crossing our bow, and at
0335 fired a spread of four straight stern shots at the near AK, range 1500, 80 port track, speed 8. The first three hit their points of aim in the screws, and the after and forward ends of the midships superstructure. Watched the freighter sinking by the stern amidst milling escorts. She was a split superstructure freighter, with details similar to the MANSEI MARU, low in the water, with a bulky deck load. When she had sunk we went to our favorite depth below the 375 foot gradient and cleared the area. Some additional depth charging followed, but none close, and we were able to search with radar and surface at 0500. (end of part one) Feb 16-17 (-10)
There were still ships in sight on the radar with one large escorted one at 14000 yards, which we tracked on course 300, speed seven knots. During the next forty minutes we pushed our TVG's and MEP's in charging and getting ahead of the freighter, but he evidently had been on a northerly leg of a wandering zig, for during the submerged approach in the next six hours he presented angles of 50 starboard to 150 port. Our best sustained speed closed the range to 6000 yards at one time, but he then drew slowly away and disappeared toward the BURRFISH who evidently made contact with him. The ASASHIO destroyer, a CHIDORI, a PC type escort, and a plane which were escorting him precluded an end-around, so proceeded submerged to our assigned position for the attack on TRUK. The freighter, in ballast, was a typical goalpost, funnel, goalposter with composite superstructure.
Feb 18-19 (-10)
Patrolling on the surface in the vicinity of assigned position 12 miles bearing 194d from ULUL. As our SJ gave fair contact on this 85 foot island at 33000 yards, remained about four miles south of assigned position out of sight of the island. Numerous SD contacts, one of which was closer than the range to the island, indicated considerable patrol or plane escort activity from ULUL. We dove for a half hour and apparently avoided detection by the one plane that did close our station inside fifteen miles.
Feb 20-21 (-10)
Shortly after dawn on the twentieth proceeded toward new station at SAIPAN, running at one engine speed. During the forenoon numerous SD contacts from 20 to 28 miles indicated air activity and perhaps a plane escort for a convoy. Searches ten miles either side of our track revealed nothing. At 0930 the morning of the twenty-first, a half hour after our trim dive, commenced submerging for enemy patrol planes. We thought we were undetected by the first one, sighted at twelve miles, but four dives later in as many hours, with lookouts reporting planes in different sectors and SD contacts closing, dived for the rest of the day.
Feb 22 (-10)
Patrolled submerged ten miles southwest of AGUIJAN Island, where we would be able to intercept traffic form SAIPAN to GUAM passing north or south of TINIAN. Sighted one surface patrol on the SJ on approaching this spot and avoided submerged after daylight. Bombers continuously passed close over us during the day. At dusk we surfaced to observe considerable searchlight signalling in vicinity of TANAPAG harbor, so headed north at two engine speed to intercept any escaping ships. Our usual SJ performance was cut down by surrounding rain squalls, barely indicating the island at 35 miles, but at 2200 the SJ sighted our first ship at 14000 yards. Closed and tracked and soon had five ships in sight on the radar, with another group sometimes visible to the north. The persistent rain squalls were both for and against us at this time, for they changed the relative size of the pips and made visual investigation of the enemy inside 3500 yards essential in selecting suitable targets.
ATTACK # 2
Following two such approaches on patrols, we found a KENYO MARU type AK with escorts on starboard bow and quarter. After tracking this freighter zigging on course 255T for another half-hour, moved into position on his port bow, 4000 yds from his nearest escort. An unpredicted zig required a "dipsy doodle" to maintain an ideal firing position, but he came on nicely, and at 2349, with range 1500, 90 port track, and TANG dead in the water and holding her breath, let him have four torpedoes spread his length from aft forward by constant TBT bearings. The enemy literally disintegrated under four hits and sank before we had completed ninety degrees of our turn to evade. One escort guessed right and closed to 3000 yards, but these boats always seem to find a couple of extra knots for such occasions, and we made a sandblower out of him.
Feb 23 (-10) ATTACK # 3
We still had difficulty in identifying the enemy on the radar, and our next approach, in spite of sound, developed into a destroyer at 3500 yards, with TANG backing down 1200 yards off her track. Both sea and visibility precluded anything but a defensive attack on such a ship, so pulled clear with minimum range 2900 yards. There followed one more approach, a bit more cautious, on what appeared to be a submarine, before we located what was apparently a naval auxiliary, definitely of the ARIMASAN MARU class. As her leading escort conveniently moved out to 8000 yards ahead, we moved into position on her port bow, stopped, and kept pointed at her with another nice rain squall for a background. As she came on her guns were plainly visible forward and then aft. At 0120, with range 1400, 90 port track and gyros around zero, let her have four torpedoes spread her length from aft forward. The first two were beautiful hits in her stern and just aft of the stack, but the detonation as the third torpedo hit forward of his bridge was terrific. The enemy ship was twisted, lifted from the water as you would flip a spoon on end, and then commenced belching flame as she sank. The TANG was shaken far worse than by any depth charge we could remember, but a quick check as soon as our jaws came off our chests, showed no damage except the outer door gasket of number five tube, which was just being secured, blew out of its groove. We considered this lightly at the time. As is usually the case when you hit first, the escorts were befuddled and evasion was simplified. It is considered that this ship was either a submarine or destroyer tender, or an ammunition ship. Further searches and one more approach disclosed only three patrol type vessels, so commenced a retiring search, covering possible positions of the northern enemy group. An all day search on the surface to north and then retiring to the west disclosed nothing.
Feb 24 (-10)
Patrolled on the surface, 150 miles west of SAIPAN, searching with high periscope and radar when horizon was fuzzy. At 1109 sighted smoke bearing 015T and immediately picked up two targets on the SJ at 23000 and 24000 yards. With a clearing horizon the enemy was shortly identified as a freighter, large tanker, and destroyer. Tracking showed them on course 270, so we moved out to maximum radar range to avoid detection and gained position ahead for a submerged approach. Contact was suddenly lost, but a half hour run at full power toward their last true bearing located them again, this time on base course 165T. Gathering rain squalls made it more apparent that we would do well to maintain contact with the enemy during the remainder of the day, and that the only possibility of destroying both ships lay in night, or night and dawn attacks. The remainder of the day became more trying with the enemy employing wide zigs and all contact being lost in extremely heavy passing squalls. Sometimes he would emerge on a new course, sometimes on the same, but in most cases it was necessary for us to go in after him at full power, and then retire to avoid detection.
ATTACK # 4
At sunset the destroyer came into a clear spot, sent several signals on a large searchlight to his convoy, lined them up with tanker astern, and started off on course west. As soon as they had faded in the dusk we closed from north at full power to find them on our port bow headed east toward SAIPAN. Two enemy zigs were of the wildest sort, sometimes actually backtracking, but their very wildness was his undoing, for after two hours of tracking, and two more of approaches on their quarters, with our outer doors open for firing on four different occasions, the freighter, a TATUTAKI MARU class ship, made one of his super right zigs across our bow. At 2230, when the range was 1400, 95 starboard track, gyros around zero, we cold-cocked him with the first three of our usual four torpedoes, spread along his length by constant TBT bearings. The ship went to pieces and amidst beautiful fireworks sank before we had completed our turn to evade. The tanker opened fire fore and aft immediately, while the destroyer, then nearly 3000 yards away, closed the scene rapidly, spraying shells in every direction. After helping out any possible survivors with twelve depth charges, he rejoined the tanker. During the first flurry some tracer shells came within a thousand yards or so of us, but obviously just by chance. The destroyer now stayed so close to the tanker that for several hours we could distinguish only one ship on the radar most of the time, from our position ten thousand yards on his port beam. The sporadic gun firing and occasional depth charges convinced us on these occasions that both were still there. They continued on the same base course, but settled down to moderate zigs. Before dawn we were in position, ten thousand yards ahead and still eighty miles west of SAIPAN. Only a daylight change of base course could prevent our attack.
ATTACK # 5
At 0548, with skies gray in the east, submerged to radar depth, took a last check at range at 7000 yards, then started a submerged approach to close an apparent 30d left zig. Eighteen minutes later the tanker was in sight with an ASASHIO type destroyer patrolling very close ahead. As we were then 1200 yards from the track, turned and paralleled his base course. At range 2000 yards the destroyer gave us some bad moments by crossing to our bow for the second time, pointed directly at our position. But in his attempt to prevent a repetition of his mistake of the night before, he turned right, passed down the tanker's side to that quarter. He was obsolutely dwarfed by the length of the loaded tanker, whose details were now plainly visible. She was painted slate gray, comparable only to our CIMARRON class, but with bridge and foremast well forward, just behind a bulging bow, which mounted an estimated six inch gun. Her mainmast was close against her after superstructure which was topped by an extremely large short stack. Her after gun, above her bulging cruiser stern, was similar to the one forward. There is no similar vessel in any of the identification books aboard. All vantage points including guns, bridge, bridge overhead, and rails, were manned with an estimated 150 uniformed lookouts on our side alone. A twenty degree zig toward put us a little close to the track, but we had already commenced our turn away for a stern shot. We were far from inconvenienced. At 0639, with the escort just crossing the tanker's stern to the far side, fired four torpedoes by constant bearings, range 500 yards, 90 starboard track, gyros around 180d. The first three hit as aimed, directly under the stack, at the forward end of his after superstructure, and under his bridge. The explosions were wonderful, throwing the Japs and other debris above the belching smoke. He sank by the stern in four minutes, and then we went deep and avoided. The depth charges started a minute later, but were never close.
Our blown torpedo tube gasket, which we considered lightly on the 23rd, now caused trouble, for the inner door gasket rolled out of its groove under the pressure, and pumps would not keep up with the water. With safety tank nearly dry, regained good control at 80 feet and avoided for the rest of the day at this depth, with occasional looks at 60 feet when our destroyer came close. He was persistent, probably hearing our pumps, one of which had to be run continuously, and spurred on, too, by thoughts of a slit belly if he failed. Dark finally came after our longest day, and a new inner door gasket was installed without much trouble after surfacing. T shaped gaskets, similar to those just installed in hatches, should obviously be installed in inaccessible torpedo tube outer doors at the first practicable date. With four forward torpedoes left, proceeded northward toward the lower BONINS, our new patrol area.
Feb 26 (-10)
ATTACK # 6
Patrolled on the surface, proceeding to new area. At 1543, when about 180 miles northwest of SAIPAN, sighted smoke which quickly developed in to a four ship convoy. Tracked them on course 160 until dark, identifying one as a two- stacker. Remained outside of 20000 yards until moonset, when radar tracking showed then to be worm turning, on base course east. The rear ship of the convoy was small with a patrolling escort astern that we could not see at 3000 yards, so passed him up in searching for our two stacker. We found her shortly, astern of the leading freighter, and just ahead of a small unidentified vessel. Escorts on either bow of the leading freighter offered no difficulty in closing the two stacker from the flank. She was now tracked on straight course 090 and we watched her closely from 3000 yards before closing in to a firing position. A column zig brought the leading freighter across our port bow, so twisted left, steadied, and fired our usual spread of four torpedoes covering the entire length of the two stacker as he came by, radar range 1600, gyros near zero, 100 starboard track. All torpedoes, even the one fired at his bow, apparently missed astern as we failed to detect his increasing speed as he resumed worm turning. Had a little difficulty in evading the escorts as one closed after we thought we were clear. He challenged us with "S8" on a signal searchlight several times, which furthers our suspicion that the lagging escort, which we could not see at 3000 yards, was an enemy submarine. Though it is disappointing not to destroy this passenger ship, the HORAI MARU, there is no use in crying over spilt milk. The TANG is far from cocky, and just as determined as ever. Sent contact report on 450, and message to COMSUBPAC concerning expenditure of torpedoes, then headed for Midway on route prescribed for another of our submarines. (end of part two) Feb 27-Mar 3
Own data: Speed 8, Course 028. Depth Surf. Angle 0.
FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA # 6
Type attack Night surface.
Tubes fired #1 #2 #3 #6
Track angle 100S 102S 104S 107S
Gyro angle 353 355 357 000
Depth set 10' 10' 10' 10'
Power High High High High
Hit or miss Miss Miss Miss Miss
Erratic No No No No
Mk torpedo 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A 14-3A
Serial no. 40162 40105 23830 39928
Mk exploder 6-1A 6-1A 6-1A 6-1A
Serial no. 8032 11049 6557 8377
Actuation Contact Contact Contact Contact
Mk warhead 16 16 16 16
Serial no. 11438 2100 11351 3902
Explosive TPX TPX TPX TPX
Firing interval 8 sec. 8 sec. 10 sec.
Type spread Divergent point of aim
Sea Conditions Choppy
Overhaul activity USS BUSHNELL
(I) MINES AND MINE LAYING
(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS
Numerous escorts were encountered with every contact, but their patrolling was unsystematic and sooner or later left an opening for attack, generally on the flank. As it was possible to come unbelievably close on the quarter of an escort without being sighted, poor stern or quarter lookouts on their part is indicated. Their gunfire and depth charging was of the wildest sort and most ineffectual. As always evasion was easy when the enemy was hit first, and much simplified by the PPI.
(K) MAJOR DEFECTS
The only design weakness encountered is the old type dove-tailed gasket in torpedo tube doors. Replacement of the outer door gasket is impossible, except in the calmest sea, and its failure immediately limits a submarine to dangerously shallow depths. As hatch gaskets, which are readily accessible are now of the T type, it seems evident that torpedo tube door gaskets should be modified likewise as soon as practicable.
Both reception and transmission were satisfactory.
Although requiring considerable checking and attention by radar personnel, both SJ and SD worked reliably and were of great value.
(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS.
(O) DENSITY LAYERS
1. 8-10 N 149-20 E 6d at 375' 2. 15-45 N 144-22 E 5d at 475'
(P) HEALTH, FOOD AND HABITABILITY
Although training in diving was limited by the requirements of the patrol areas, this was in a large part compensated for by the extra efforts to qualify that always accompany surface patrolling.
(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED
(a) Pearl to first area 4272 mi. 29100 gals (b) In areas 2310 mi. 23400 gals (c) Last area to Midway 2300 mi. 27330 gals
Days enroute to areas 13 Days in areas: WAKE 7 North of TRUK 6 West of TRUK 4 West of SAIPAN 5 Days enroute from area 6 Days submerged (including 6 days off WAKE) 10
(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING
Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel None 20000 40 days Indefinite
Limiting factor this patrol - Torpedoes.
SUBMARINE DIVISION SIXTY-ONE FB5-61/A16-3
Serial 052 In Care of Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California, March 4, 1944.
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to U.S.S. TANG Report of First War Patrol
From: The Commander Submarine Division Sixty-one. To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Subordinate Command. (2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. (3) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. TANG - Report of First War Patrol.
1. This was the first war patrol for the TANG and the first of Lieutenant Commander R. H. O'KANE as a Commanding Officer. The patrol was of forty-one days duration, of which twenty-two were spent in assigned areas and nineteen days enroute. Patrol was terminated when all torpedoes had been expended.
2. The early part of the patrol consisted of lifeguard duty for downed planes in the vicinity of WAKE and TRUK. The TANG was apparently not called on for rescue services. Area coverage was thorough. During patrol four contacts were made with groups of ships including targets worthy of torpedo attack. Attacks were made on each group.
3. (A) Early morning 17 February a convoy of two freighters with a heavy escort of a destroyer and five small vessels were contacted by radar. During the approach TANG was detected by an escort at a range of 7000 yards and forced to deep submergence. Five depth charges sere dropped in a half hearted attack and the escort continued on. Fifteen minutes later TANG resumed the approach at radar depth in spite of additional depth charges in the vicinity, dropped at random by escorts. The range was closed to 1,500 yards and three hits of four torpedoes fired sank a freighter. TANG cleared the area at deep submergence undetected. An attempt was made to again get ahead of the convoy for a dawn attack, but the remaining freighter passed out of range under cover of air escort.
(B) During the night of 22 February two night surface attacks were made on a convoy of three freighters with a destroyer and three smaller escorts. In each attack four torpedoes were fired at close range, one resulting in four hits and the other in three. Both targets quickly sank. TANG evaded on the surface. During the following day the remnants of the convoy could not be found.
(C) About 1100, 24 February a tanker, a freighter, and a destroyer were sighted at about 12 miles. Effort to gain a satisfactory position for day periscope attack was unsuccessful;, because of rain squalls and the wide zig zags of the targets. Contact was maintained and a night surface attack with four torpedoes resulted in three good hits which destroyed the freighter. TANG retired. on the surface amid enemy shell fire and random depth charges. Contact with the tanker and destroyer was maintained and position gained for dawn attack submerged. Decks of the tanker were covered with lookouts as three of four torpedoes fired hit and sank this ship in four minutes. A counter-attack followed without damage to the TANG although the evasion tactics were hampered by the necessity of pumping bilges and blowing safety tank, because a torpedo tube outer door gasket had been blown out and the inner door gasket rolled out of its groove under pressure.
(D) The final attack was made after moonset on 26 February after a late afternoon contact had been made and the enemy tracked. A transport, a freighter and four escorts made up the convoy. TANG maneuvered into position on the wildly zig zagging transport and fired four torpedoes at a range of 1600 yards. All missed astern apparently due to an increase of enemy speed. The approach and retirement were made on the surface.
4. The material condition of the TANG is excellent. It is expected that the refit will be completed in ten days. Consideration should be given to the replacement of torpedo tube door gaskets with T-shaped gaskets in the future.
5. The Commanding Officer, Officers and crew of the TANG are heartily congratulated on this very aggressive and successful first patrol and the excellent start the have given this new ship. It is recommended that the following damage inflicted on the enemy be credited to the TANG:
C. C. SMITH.
A16-3/ COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET,
SUBORDINATE COMMAND, NAVY NO. 1504.
Serial No. 050
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
5 March 1944.
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. TANG Report of
First War Patrol.
From: Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
Subordinate Command, Navy No. 1504.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. TANG - Report of First War Patrol.
2. The first war patrol of the TANG can only be classified as
outstanding. Of the six attacks made, five were made on consecutive days. Five
of the attacks resulted in destruction of the target and tremendous damage was
inflicted on the enemy.
3. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Subordinate Command
adds his congratulations to the Commanding Officer, Officers and crew on this
outstanding first patrol and concurs on the summation of damage dealt the enemy,
as contained in the first endorsement.
C. D. EDMUNDS
SUBMARINE, PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 0473 In Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
11 March 1944.
THIRD ENDORSEMENT to NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED
U.S.S. TANG Report of PRIOR TO ENTERING PATROL AREA.
First War Patrol
COMSUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 380
U.S.S. TANG - FIRST WAR PATROL
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS306) - Report of First War Patrol.
(22 January to 3 March 1944)
1. The first war patrol of the TANG was also the first for the
Commanding Officer, as such. The patrol was conducted in the Caroline and
Marianas Islands area.
2. Six outstanding attacks were made during this patrol, all of which
were extremely well planned, determined and aggressive, resulting in severe
damage to the enemy.
3. Sixteen out of 24 torpedoes fired is most commendable, and
adequately shows the excellence of the TANG's fire control party.
4. This patrol is designated as successful for Combat Insignia award.
5. The commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the
Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this well planned, aggressive, and
very successful war patrol. The TANG is credited with inflicting the following
damage upon the enemy:
S U N K
1 - Freighter (MANSEI MARU class) 7,700 tons (Attack No. 1)
1 - Freighter (KENYO MARU class) 6,468 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Submarine Tender 8,663 tons (Attack No. 3)
1 - Freighter (TATUTAKI MARU class) 7,068 tons (Attack No. 4)
1 - Naval Tanker 12,000tons (Attack No. 5)
TOTAL 41,969 tons
J. H. BROWN, Jr.